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Abstract
Theory predicts that mandated employment protections may reduce productivity by distort-
ing production choices. Firms facing (non-Coasean) worker dismissal costs will curtail hiring
below e¢ cient levels and retain unproductive workers, both of which should a⁄ect productivity.
These theoretical predictions have rarely been tested. We use the adoption of wrongful-discharge
protections by U.S. state courts over the last three decades to evaluate the link between dis-
missal costs and productivity. Drawing on establishment-level data from the Annual Survey of
Manufacturers and the Longitudinal Business Database, our estimates suggest that wrongful-
discharge protections reduce employment ￿ ows and ￿rm entry rates. Moreover, analysis of
plant-level data provides evidence of capital deepening and a decline in total factor productivity
following the introduction of wrongful-discharge protections. This last result is potentially quite
important, suggesting that mandated employment protections reduce productive e¢ ciency as
theory would suggest. However, our analysis also presents some puzzles including, most signif-
icantly, evidence of strong employment growth following adoption of dismissal protections. In
light of these puzzles, we read our ￿ndings as suggestive but tentative.
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11 Introduction
An extensive literature explores the impact of dismissal costs￿ also frequently called ￿ring costs
or employment protection￿ on the operation of labor markets. Beginning with the seminal work
of Lazear (1990), much research has focused on assessing how dismissal costs a⁄ect employment
levels. Theory suggests, however, that dismissal costs may have ambiguous e⁄ects on employment
levels. Dismissal costs act as a tax on ￿ring, which reduces dismissals but also reduces hiring.
The net e⁄ect of these o⁄setting factors is ambiguous, at least in the short run. It is perhaps not
surprising therefore that the empirical literature has found widely varying e⁄ects of dismissal costs
on employment levels.
By contrast, theory makes a clear prediction about the impact of dismissal costs on the e¢ ciency
of hiring and ￿ring. Provided that dismissal protections are not undone by Coasean bargaining,
dismissal protections raise ￿rms￿adjustments costs. Consequently, ￿rms will ￿nd it optimal not
to hire workers whose short-term marginal product exceeds their market wage and will choose to
retain unproductive workers whose wage exceeds their productivity (cf. Blanchard and Portugal
2001). These distortions in production choices unambiguously reduce worker ￿ ows. They are also
likely to cause ￿rms to substitute capital for labor and have the potential to reduce productivity
by distorting production choices.
This paper evaluates whether, and to what extent, the introduction of dismissal costs a⁄ects
￿rms￿production choices and, ultimately, their productivity. The source of variation in dismissal
costs that we exploit is the adoption of wrongful discharge protections by U.S. state courts from the
late 1970s to the early 1990s. These common-law protections against wrongful discharge generated a
￿ ood of litigation in adopting states and increased the uncertainty and potential cost of discharging
workers. As has been established in prior work using both household survey data and aggregate
state-level employment data, adoption of wrongful discharge laws had measurable e⁄ects on state
employment levels, unemployment-to-employment ￿ ows, and the outsourcing of jobs to temporary
help employers (cf. Miles 2000; Schanzenbach 2003; Autor 2003; Autor et al. 2004 and 2006; Kugler
and Saint Paul 2004). Yet, these aggregate e⁄ects have rarely been explored using representative
1microdata on ￿rms, nor have their consequences for productivity been assessed.1
In this paper, we simultaneously analyze the consequences of employment protections for
establishment-level employment ￿ ows and productivity. We ￿rst test whether dismissal costs re-
duce employment volatility￿ a necessary implication of any standard non-Coasean model￿ both at
the extensive (entry/exit) margin and intensive (within-plant) margin. We next assess whether any
reduction in employment volatility is accompanied by a reduction in productivity.
Our analysis exploits detailed, comprehensive establishment-level data from two Census Bureau
surveys: the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) and the Annual Survey of Manufacturers
(ASM). Sourced from U.S. tax records and Census surveys, the LBD provides annual employment
and payroll information on all U.S. private establishments in most lines of business. The LBD is
thus an exceptional resource for identifying the e⁄ects of dismissal costs on how ￿rms adjust their
labor inputs; its employment and wage records cannot, however, facilitate a further study of the
concomitant adjustments of other factors of production and the consequences for productivity. We
thus complement the LBD with a balanced panel of ￿ ongoing￿manufacturing plants continuously
surveyed by the ASM. We ￿rst demonstrate that the impact of dismissal costs on employment
adjustment within this panel mirrors the LBD manufacturing universe, and then turn to the ASM￿ s
detailed operating data (e.g., output, capital investment, employment) to study extensively the
important productivity outcomes.
We ￿nd that one of the three dismissal protections adopted during this period, the Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing (￿ good faith￿hereafter), reduced annual employment ￿ uctuations and
the entry of new establishments in adopting states. Consistent with the apparent rise in adjustment
costs, we document that ￿rms in adopting states engaged in capital deepening, leading to a concur-
rent rise in labor productivity. Notably, we ￿nd evidence of a decline in total factor productivity
following adoption of the good faith exception. Our e⁄ects are strongest in the short-run, peaking
around three years after the adoption and declining afterwards. These results suggest that adop-
1In contemporaneous work, Bird and Knopf (2005) analyze the e⁄ects of wrongful-discharge protections on the
earnings, pro￿tability and e¢ ciency of the U.S. banking sector from 1980 to 1990. They conclude that adoption
of wrongful-discharge protections raised wages, reduced pro￿ts and lowered productivity in this sector. Petrin and
Sivadasan (2006) introduce and implement a novel framework for estimating the e⁄ects of employment protection
legislation on productivity, focusing on its impact on the gap between workers￿marginal revenue product and the
wage. Using data from Chile, they ￿nd that increases in ￿ring costs raise this gap. Prieger (2005) examines the
impact of the Americans with Disabilities Act on the entry and exit of ￿rms in retail.
2tion of dismissal protections altered short-run production choices and caused employers to retain
unproductive workers, leading to a reduction in technical e¢ ciency. Clouding the interpretation of
these results, however, is the ￿nding that adoption of the good faith exception is associated with
implausibly large subsequent growth in manufacturing employment. This pattern suggests that
our results may be partly contaminated by confounding economic shocks. Thus, while our analysis
provides novel direct evidence that employment protections may reduce ￿rm-level productivity,
the results must be viewed as tentative. It is our hope that future studies will provide further
exploration of these initial results.
2 Wrongful Discharge Protections in the United States
The U.S. has long had a legal presumption that workers and employers may freely terminate their
employment relationships ￿ at will,￿that is without noti￿cation, ￿nancial penalty or requirement
to demonstrate good (or any) cause. This legal doctrine, referred to as employment-at-will, was
￿rst articulated by the Tennessee Supreme Court in 1884 and was subsequently adopted into the
common law by almost all U.S. state courts by the mid 1930s (cf. Morriss 1994).2
Beginning in the 1970s, the legal consensus supporting employment-at-will eroded rapidly. In
a series of precedent-setting cases between 1972 and 1992, the vast majority of U.S. state courts
adopted one or more common-law exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine. These exceptions
constrained the ability of employers operating in adopting states to terminate workers ￿ at will.￿
These common-law exceptions are typically classi￿ed into three categories: 1) the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing (￿ good faith￿exception); 2) the tort of wrongful discharge in violation
of public policy (￿ public policy￿exception); and 3) the implied-in-fact contract not to terminate
without good cause (￿ implied contract￿exception).3 We summarize these exceptions here and refer
2Idaho, New Jersey and New Mexico adopted employment-at-will in 1948, 1953 and 1968, respectively. Prior to
Idaho, the most recent was Wyoming in 1937. Montana is the only state to have implemented exceptions to the
employment-at-will doctrine by statute rather than common law (cf. Ewing et al. 2005).
3For detailed discussion of the evolution of the employment-at-will doctrine, see Morriss (1994 and 1995), Autor
(2003), Kugler and Saint Paul (2004) and Autor et al. (2006). Our discussion draws particularly on the latter work,
which contains (at present) the most current legal analysis. Legal scholars, including most notably Dertouzos and
Karoly (1992), also categorize these exceptions according to whether they allow for tortious damages (i.e., pain,
su⁄ering, and possibly punitive damages) in addition to contractual damages (i.e., exclusively economic losses).
Recent work has not found that this distinction is empirically relevant (cf. Autor et al. 2006), however, and hence
we focus on the three categories of legal exception.
3the reader to Autor et al. (2006) for an extended discussion.
Read broadly, the good faith exception prohibits employers from ￿ring workers for ￿ bad cause.￿
The de￿nition of ￿ bad cause,￿however, varies greatly by state and over time. The California Court of
Appeals￿famous 1980 good faith ruling in Cleary v. American Airlines4￿ likely the most in￿ uential
of all good faith cases￿ was initially understood to bar California employers from terminating any
worker without good cause. However, the California Supreme Court￿ s 1988 ruling in Foley v.
Interactive Data Corp vastly reduced the scope of the Cleary decision and limited the ￿nancial
remedies available to plainti⁄s.5 At present, all eleven state courts that recognize the good faith
exception (including California) primarily limit awards to ￿ timing￿cases in which the employer
intentionally terminates a worker to deprive her of a promised bene￿t (e.g., a sales commission
or non-vested pension). Hence, ￿ bad cause￿under the good faith exception is currently construed
narrowly, though this was not always the case.
The public policy exception, recognized by 43 states as of 1999, provides workers with protec-
tions against discharges that would inhibit them from acting in accordance with public policy. In
states recognizing the public policy exception, workers may, for example, litigate if they are ￿red for
performing jury duty, ￿ling a worker￿ s compensation claim, reporting an employer￿ s wrongdoing, or
refusing to commit perjury on behalf of the employer. Because courts typically limit public policy
cases to clear violations of explicit legislative commands, rather than violations of a vaguer sense
of public obligation, the public policy exception is not generally thought to impose substantial
constraints on employer behavior.
The implied contract exception, also recognized by 43 states in 1999, comes into force when
an employer implicitly promises not to terminate a worker without good cause. Such implicit
promises may include, for example: personnel manuals stating that the employer￿ s policy is to
terminate employees only for just cause; expectations arising from a worker￿ s longevity of service or
history of promotions and salary increases; and usual company practices that preclude terminating
workers without good cause. The expected economic impact of the implied contract exception
4168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980 October).
5765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988). Whereas the Cleary decision permitted plainti⁄s to recover tortious damages for
violations of the good faith doctrine, Foley reduced these damages to contractual losses (cf. Jung and Harkness
1989).
4is hard to gauge. On the one hand, employers can potentially ￿ contract around￿this exception
simply by rewording personnel manuals and adding explicit language to employment contracts to
state that all employees remain ￿ at will.￿ 6 On the other hand, ￿rms without sophisticated human
resources sta⁄ may be unaware of the implied contract exception or lack the expertise to fully
insulate themselves from its reach. Additionally, the implied contract exception can potentially
reclassify an employer￿ s entire workforce as not ￿ at will,￿which may impose signi￿cant costs.
To assess the e⁄ects of these employment-at-will exceptions on productivity and employment
outcomes, we adopt a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence approach that contrasts state-level change in out-
comes in adopting states to contemporaneous changes in outcomes in non-adopting states. This
treatment-control contrast identi￿es the average causal e⁄ect of the exceptions on the outcomes
of interest under the assumption that these outcomes would have otherwise evolved similarly in
adopting and non-adopting states. We take a number of steps to buttress the robustness of this
statistical approach. All econometric models include industry or industry-by-year ￿xed e⁄ects (in
addition to state ￿xed e⁄ects) to absorb industry-wide shocks that may be correlated across states.
In addition, most speci￿cations include state-speci￿c linear time trends to account for possible
pre-existing trends that may predate the adoption of employment-at-will exceptions and could oth-
erwise be confounded with adoption. Some speci￿cations further include plant ￿xed e⁄ects, where
identi￿cation comes from contrasts of within-plant changes in outcomes in adopting relative to
non-adopting states. As a falsi￿cation test, we also estimate dynamic models that contrast changes
in outcomes in years prior to and following adoption of exceptions to provide a check on the pos-
sibility that adoption of employment-at-will exceptions are caused by changes in outcomes rather
than vice-versa.
Figure 1 plots the number of states recognizing each of the three exceptions during the time
period of 1970 to 1999 (at monthly frequency).7 Two main points are visible. First, the public
policy and implied contract exceptions are far more widely recognized than the good faith exception.
6And indeed, large employers took such steps. The Bureau of National A⁄airs (1985) found that 63 percent of
large employers surveyed in the early 1980s had recently ￿removed or changed wording in company publications to
avoid any suggestion of an employment contract,￿and 53 percent had ￿added wording to applications and handbooks
specifying that employment may be terminated for any reason.￿Sutton and Dobbin (1996) report that the percentage
of ￿rms using ￿ at will￿clauses in employment contracts increased from 0 to 29 percent between 1955 and 1985.
7The dips in the series re￿ ect court reversals of doctrines that were previously recognized.
5Second, adoption of each exception appears to follow something of a contagion pattern, with a
large number of adoptions occurring in rapid succession between 1976 and 1988, followed by near-
stasis from 1988 forward. This pattern suggests that adoptions that cannot be viewed as fully
independent, but that a widespread change in legal thinking in the 1970s and 1980s led many
state courts to amend the longstanding doctrine of employment-at-will at around the same time.
This potentially presents a challenge for identi￿cation in that businesses might react in advance to
anticipated changes in the legal environment, thus blurring the pre-post contrast. However, the date
at which a state adopts a given exception is an idiosyncratic function of the cases brought before
state high courts and the disposition of the sitting judges. Many states never adopt exceptions
and others reverse or amend these exceptions after adoption. Accordingly, precedent-setting cases
that generate exceptions to employment-at-will typically will provide a discrete element of surprise.
This is particularly likely to be true for the good faith exception, which was adopted more slowly
and less extensively than either the public policy or implied contract exceptions.
As emphasized by Autor et al. (2006), it is likely that a substantial component of the economic
cost of the employment-at-will exceptions emanates from the uncertainty they introduced into the
employment relationship. When most exceptions were adopted in the late 1970s through late 1980s,
the volume and cost of wrongful discharge litigation that would ultimately ensue was unknown to
￿rms and potential litigants. Adding to the uncertainty, personnel and professional law journals
(i.e., the trade publications relied upon by personnel managers and corporate attorneys) published
numerous articles that appeared to overstate the scope of the protections a⁄orded to workers and
the penalties that ￿rms would incur for violating them (cf. Edelman et al. 1992). Because employers
were potentially led to anticipate greater constraints and costs than ultimately materialized, Autor
et al. (2006) argue that the short-term and medium-term e⁄ects of these dismissal protections may
have exceeded their ￿ steady-state￿e⁄ects, and they present evidence consistent with this hypothesis.
Several prior studies have analyzed the e⁄ects of employment-at-will exceptions on labor market
outcomes. The ￿rst study in this vein, Dertouzos and Karoly (1992), found using aggregate state-
level data that adoption of common-law dismissal protections reduced state employment levels by
as much as seven percent. Subsequent analyses by Miles (2000), Schanzenbach (2003) and Autor
et al. (2004 and 2006) using industry-level and household-level data do not con￿rm these results,
6however. These more recent studies ￿nd either modest negative e⁄ects (Autor et al., Schanzenbach)
or no e⁄ects of dismissal protections on employment levels (Miles). As noted above, however, theory
makes ambiguous predictions about the impact of dismissal costs on employment levels.
A number of studies also provide evidence that states￿adoption of dismissal protections raised
hiring and ￿ring costs. Miles (2000) and Autor (2003) show that employers in adopting states substi-
tuted temporary help agency workers for direct-hire employees, presumably in an e⁄ort to minimize
litigation risks.8 Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004) ￿nd using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
that these protections (especially the good faith exception) reduced the re-employment probability
of unemployed relative to employed workers, suggesting that dismissal protections exacerbated ad-
verse selection into non-employment. Both sets of ￿ndings are signi￿cant for our work because they
demonstrate that the adoption of dismissal protections raised ￿rms￿adjustment costs￿ a necessary
condition for them to have had productivity impacts.
Our study builds on this prior work in two major respects. First, use of establishment-level data
provides direct evidence on the e⁄ects of dismissal protections on ￿rms￿employment adjustments at
both the extensive (plant opening/closing) and intensive (job ￿ ows) margins. Second, we directly
evaluate the consequences of dismissal protections for establishment-level production choices and
realized productivity.
3 Theoretical Considerations
In a standard competitive model of the labor market, employment protections are economically
equivalent to mandated employment bene￿ts. Bene￿t mandates raise the cost of employing workers,
leading to an inward shift in labor demand. If, however, workers value the mandated bene￿t at
its marginal cost of provision￿ that is, the mandate is e¢ cient￿ then the Coase theorem applies.
Labor supply shifts outward to o⁄set the inward shift in labor demand, employment levels are
unchanged and wages fall to cover exactly the cost of the bene￿t (cf. Summers 1989; Lazear 1990).
There are no productivity or employment consequences.9
8The implied contract exception in particular confers a comparative advantage on temporary help agencies since
these ￿rms are universally understood to o⁄er only short-term employment. It is the implied contract exception that
appears primarily responsible for the growth of temporary help agency employment (cf. Autor 2003).
9Aghion and Hermalin (1990) and Levine (1991) present models in which dismissal protections are under-provided
by the private market due to adverse selection. Bertola (2004) also presents a model in which dismissal costs are under-
7Mandatory dismissal protections can impose e¢ ciency costs in the competitive model, however.
If workers value dismissal protections at less than their marginal cost of provision￿ or, equivalently,
if some share of the termination bene￿t accrues to a third-party, such as an attorney￿ the bene￿t
mandate drives a wedge between the private and social cost of job separations, yielding a dead-
weight loss. Because dismissal costs are only paid when workers and ￿rms separate, the deadweight
loss component of the dismissal cost functions as a tax on separations￿ an adjustment cost. Con-
sider, for example, a case where a worker￿ s marginal product falls below his wage and the wage
cannot drop su¢ ciently to compensate the ￿rm (either due to a non-negativity constraint or due
to downward wage rigidities). If the worker values the dismissal bene￿t at its marginal cost, both
the worker and the ￿rm will agree to terminate the job. If the payment of the dismissal bene￿t
incurs a deadweight loss, however, both the worker and the ￿rm will ￿nd it optimal to continue the
employment relationship so long as the present value of the productivity shortfall is less than the
deadweight loss. Consequently, ine¢ cient dismissal protections￿ that is, protections that workers
value at less than cost￿ inhibit e¢ cient job separations (and, indirectly, reduce e¢ cient accessions
as well).
In the competitive model, these ine¢ cient dismissal protections unambiguously reduce allocative
e¢ ciency￿ that is, they are welfare reducing. Their implications for the technical e¢ ciency of
production are less clear cut. If dismissal protections cause ￿rms to retain (some) unproductive
workers, this will cause a decline in labor productivity, ceteris paribus. O⁄setting this factor, ￿rms
may screen new hires more stringently, leading to a favorable compositional shift in the productivity
of the employed workforce. Moreover, because ine¢ cient dismissal protections provide ￿rms with
an incentive to substitute from labor to other factors of production, capital deepening may also
raise the marginal product of labor. Hence, the net impact on technical e¢ ciency (as opposed to
allocative e¢ ciency) is ambiguous.
While many labor economists use this competitive model as a benchmark, much of the macro-
provided due to risk-aversion. Agell (1999) discusses why eliminating dismissal protections may not be desirable when
labor markets are subject to fairness considerations and market imperfections, while Wasmer (2006) and Macleod
and Nakavachara (2006) focus on human capital investment. In all these cases, dismissal protection mandates can be
e¢ ciency-enhancing since workers may value these protections above their cost of provision. In the Coasean model,
this would imply that imposing the mandate would raise employment levels. See Saint-Paul (2002) and Br￿gemann
(2006) for theories on the political economy of employment protection.
8economic literature views employment protection through the lens of the Diamond-Mortensen-
Pissarides equilibrium unemployment model (cf. Mortensen and Pissarides 1994; Kugler et al.
2003). As in the competitive model, dismissal costs in the equilibrium unemployment model cur-
tail e¢ cient separations by reducing the threshold productivity at which ￿rms are willing to dismiss
workers, thus reducing productivity. In contrast to the competitive model, however, worker-￿rm
matches in the equilibrium unemployment setting generate quasi-rents, and the allocation of rents
between ￿rms and workers is typically determined through Nash bargaining. Nash bargaining
exacerbates the deadweight loss from ine¢ cient employment protections.10 In the Nash bargain,
dismissal costs reduce the ￿rms￿outside options or ￿ threat points,￿causing workers￿wage demands
to rise even as pro￿ts fall. Facing lower pro￿ts and higher wage demands, ￿rms curtail job creation
and increase the threshold productivity at which they are willing to hire. The induced rise in reser-
vation productivity potentially leads to an increase in ￿rm-level productivity since less productive
matches are not realized.11 Hence, the net productivity e⁄ect is again ambiguous.
Although the competitive and equilibrium unemployment models di⁄er in their details, both
imply that dismissal protections dampen employment adjustments but have ambiguous e⁄ects
on ￿rms￿ productivity. On the other hand, both models indicate that if dismissal protections
do not reduce job ￿ ows (perhaps because they satisfy Coasean equivalence), these protections
should not a⁄ect productivity. These theoretical observations motivate our empirical approach.
We begin by assessing whether adoptions of exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine reduce
job ￿ ows. We next turn to an analysis of their consequences for ￿rm productivity. Because of
the many possible avenues of adjustment noted above, our empirical work examines the impacts
of dismissal protections on multiple plant-level production outcomes including capital investment,
capital intensity, labor productivity and total factor productivity.
10Nash bargaining ampli￿es ine¢ ciencies because it is non-Coasean; the initial allocation of property rights a⁄ects
both the distribution of resources and the e¢ ciency of bargained outcomes (cf. Grout 1984).
11Although productivity impacts are ambiguous, welfare consequences are generally negative, as in the competitive
case above. If the search equilibrium is not initially constrained e¢ cient, however, it is possible for policy interventions
to improve aggregate e¢ ciency (cf. Pissarides 2000, chapter 8).
94 Data Description
Establishment-level data are essential for characterizing how ￿rms and their associated establish-
ments respond to the passage of dismissal protections. This project draws such data from two
con￿dential surveys collected by the Census Bureau￿ the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD)
and the Annual Survey of Manufacturers (ASM). Each survey is described below, and Table 1
provides descriptive statistics.
4.1 Longitudinal Business Database
The LBD is a unique source for studying employment dynamics across manufacturing and non-
manufacturing sectors. Sourced from IRS tax data and Census surveys, the LBD annually covers
approximately 3.9 million establishments with positive employment, representing over 68 million
employees, in most U.S. private industries. Panel A of Table 1 highlights that most of the LBD￿ s
surveyed employees are in the manufacturing, retail trade and services sectors. These percentages
are fairly similar for states passing dismissal protections and those not doing so.12
The microdata ￿rst facilitate the development of complete state-industry-year panels of employ-
ment by summing employment counts across individual establishments. Publicly available series
normally do not provide employment counts by state-industry; even when they do so, the Census
Bureau is required to suppress values that compromise the con￿dentiality of individual establish-
ments. Building from the microdata overcomes these limitations and a full employment panel is
developed for the 1976 to 1999 sample frame.
From this state-industry-year panel, we can estimate absolute year-over-year employment changes.
The mean absolute employment change over the sample is approximately 11 percent. This absolute
job turnover metric aggregates over employment adjustments on the intensive margin (i.e., the
hiring and ￿ring of workers by continuing establishments) and the entry/exit margin. In the LBD,
establishments are assigned unique and time-invariant identi￿ers that further a⁄ord longitudinal
estimations of these two dimensions of adjustment. The entry and exit rates for establishments are
12The LBD￿ s sample frame during the 1976 to 1999 period includes mining; construction; manufacturing; wholesale
trade; retail trade; and services (except hospitals, education services, social services, and private households). Sectors
not included for the full panel are agriculture, forestry and ￿shing; transportation and public utilities; ￿nance,
insurance and real estate; and public administration. Jarmin and Miranda (2002) describe the construction of the
LBD.
10approximately 13 percent and 11 percent, respectively. As many entering and exiting establish-
ments are very small in size, only 7 percent and 6 percent of employees are working in entering or
exiting establishments, respectively.13 Finally, the survey￿ s reporting structure a⁄ords the linkage
of establishments to their parent ￿rms. Approximately 22 percent of establishments and 55 percent
of employees are part of multi-unit ￿rms.
4.2 Annual Survey of Manufacturers
While the LBD provides a comprehensive view of employment dynamics across manufacturing and
non-manufacturing sectors, reported data are limited to total employment and payroll only. To
evaluate the impact of reduced job turnover for capital and productivity outcomes, we turn to two
detailed surveys of manufacturers undertaken by the Census Bureau. The Census of Manufacturers
(CM) collects operating data on all U.S. manufacturing plants at ￿ve-year intervals (i.e., 1972, 1977,
and so on). In between the CMs, the Census Bureau conducts the Annual Survey of Manufacturers
(ASM). The ASM is a probability sampled subset of the CM, with the panel redrawn two years after
each CM. Plants with more than 250 employees in the previous CM are sampled with certainty.
We extract from the ASM a balanced panel of all plants continuously monitored from 1972 to
1999. This restriction focuses on intensive adjustments in large plants operating in stable business
climates; by conditioning on survival, the extensive margin is suppressed. While the approximately
5700 plants represent less than 2 percent of all U.S. manufacturing establishments, they account for
over a quarter of total manufacturing activity in terms of employments and shipments. Almost all
of these plants are part of multi-unit ￿rms, although not all of the plants have sister establishments
within this balanced panel.
Year-over-year employment changes are again studied. While the average annual employment
change is again 11 percent, a larger fraction of these changes are negative, re￿ ecting the trend decline
in manufacturing employment from 1976 to 1999. In addition, the more detailed employment data
for manufacturers allow us to examine production and non-production workers separately; the mean
non-production worker employment share is 26 percent.
The continuous monitoring of this ASM panel a⁄ords the calculation of detailed capital stocks
13Dunne et al. (1989) and Kerr and Nanda (2006) provide additional descriptive statistics on entry and exit
patterns in the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors, respectively.
11and productivity metrics. Capital stocks are calculated with the perpetual inventory method, as
explained below. The mean plant-level capital stock for the 1976 to 1999 sample is $31m in 1999
dollars. Labor productivity is de￿ned as de￿ ated total value of shipments divided by total plant
employment. Finally, we estimate total factor productivity (TFP) as the residual from a production
function of value-added on four factors: production workers, non-production workers, machinery
capital, and structures capital.
5 Consequences of Employment Protections
In this section we discuss the impact of wrongful discharge protections on ￿rm behavior. We begin
by examining the ￿rst-order e⁄ect of employment protections on employment ￿ uctuations, both
at the intensive (within-establishment) and extensive (entry/exit) margins. If wrongful discharge
protections increase adjustment costs, this should lead to a reduction in hiring and dismissals,
resulting in an overall dampening of employment ￿ uctuations. We next test the impact of employ-
ment protections on employment levels, a margin along which prior research has obtained mixed
results. Finally, we turn to the important question of whether the possibly restricted ability of busi-
nesses to adjust employment due to the introduction of employment protections has productivity
consequences.
5.1 E⁄ects on Employment Fluctuations
We estimate the e⁄ects of the wrongful discharge exceptions (i.e., good faith, public policy and
implied contract) described in Section (2) on employment ￿ uctuations using both the LBD and
ASM. We begin by estimating the following equation using the LBD:
ABSsjt = ￿s + ￿j + ￿t + ￿GFGFst￿1 + ￿PPPPst￿1 + ￿ICICst￿1 + "sjt; (1)
where ABSsjt is the absolute year-to-year employment change of a two-digit SIC sector j, in state







12￿s, ￿j and ￿t are vectors of state, industry and time e⁄ects, respectively.14 GFst￿1, PPst￿1 and
ICst￿1 are indicators of whether the good faith, public policy and implied contract exceptions were
in place in state s at time t ￿ 1.15 Thus, the coe¢ cients ￿GF, ￿PP and ￿IC capture the e⁄ects of
employment protections on annual net employment ￿ ows.16
Our core battery of speci￿cations also includes two estimations of greater stringency. First, we
consider models with state-speci￿c time trends. These require that identi￿cation come from the
discontinuity surrounding the passage of the wrongful discharge exception. These speci￿cations can
provide reassurance that our coe¢ cients are not re￿ ecting smoothly trending omitted variables that
are potentially correlated with the adoption of the exceptions. A bene￿t of the state-industry panel
is that we can also control for industry-speci￿c trends using the non-parametric form of two-digit
SIC industry and year interactions. These latter estimations allow us to control for employment
shifts due to national trends in a state￿ s industries, again providing con￿dence in the identi￿cation
strategy.
Panels A and B of Table 2 report estimates of the e⁄ects of the wrongful discharge exceptions
on employment ￿ uctuations for the Full Sample and for manufacturing only. Panel A includes
all LBD sectors: manufacturing, mining, construction, wholesale trade, retail trade and services.
The reported standard errors account for possible error correlations across ￿rms within a state and
within states over time. We weight the samples using the mean employment level in the state-
industry-year cells during the early 1976 to 1985 period. The results for the Full Sample show a
decline in employment ￿ uctuations following the introduction of the good faith exception, though
the results are not statistically signi￿cant. By contrast, the results for the public policy and implied
contract exceptions show insigni￿cant positive impacts on employment ￿ uctuations.
When we estimate these models for manufacturing alone in Panel B, we ￿nd a negative, and
in the majority of cases, signi￿cant, e⁄ect of the good faith exception on employment ￿ uctuations.
14ABS is closely linked to Davis et al. (1996)￿ s job reallocation measure estimated at the sector level, which adds
the average positive changes in employment in a sector to the average negative changes in employment in a sector.
ABS is de￿ned to be zero if both employments are zero. ABS is bounded between [0;2], thereby minimizing the
in￿ uence of outliers.
15The one-year lag from the survey date is due to employment counts in the LBD and ASM usually being measured
as of March 1st.
16In addition to the ABS measure, we estimated models that distinguish between positive and negative adjustments.
Since we were unable to reject the hypothesis that the results are symmetric on both margins, we suppress tabulation
of these results.
13This result is robust to the inclusion of state-speci￿c and industry-speci￿c trends. It suggests a
reduction in employment ￿ uctuations of 5 to 12 percent after the introduction of the good faith
exception (i.e., dividing the -0.006 to -0.016 coe¢ cients by the average annual employment change
of 13% in Table 1 for states adopting the good faith exception). The results for the implied contract
exception remains insigni￿cant. Surprisingly, we ￿nd a positive and signi￿cant impact of the public
policy doctrine on employment ￿ uctuations in the LBD data. This latter result, however, is not
supported in the upcoming analysis of the more accurate, establishment-level ASM panel.
The initial LBD analysis suggests a signi￿cant e⁄ect of the good faith exception on employment
￿ uctuations in manufacturing. To test whether this ￿nding is consistent with a causal relationship,
we evaluate the relationship between the adoption of the good faith exception and employment
￿ uctuations using a dynamic speci￿cation:










+￿GFt￿6GFst￿6 + ￿PPt￿6PPst￿6 + ￿ICt￿6ICst￿6 + "sjt; (2)
where ￿GFst+q, ￿PPst+q and ￿ICst+q indicate whether adoption occurred at year t + q. These
dynamic variables capture the transitory e⁄ects of the reforms. GFst￿6, PPst￿6 and ICst￿6 estimate
long-term outcomes by indicating adoptions that occurred at year t￿6 or before. These coe¢ cients
are relative to the period three years prior to the reform, and their pattern indicates whether the
earlier pre-post results (1) are consistent with a causal interpretation. In particular, we would be
concerned if there are large and statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cients on the lead indicators, regardless
of whether they are positive or negative. The speci￿cation also helps identify whether the largest
impacts of the exceptions occur over the short-run or long-run.17
Appendix Table 1 presents results from this dynamic speci￿cation estimated for the manu-
facturing sector, as well as additional speci￿cations including state-speci￿c and industry-speci￿c
trends. The basic speci￿cation shows negative coe¢ cients for the good faith lags, but mostly in-
signi￿cant and weakly positive coe¢ cients for the leads, thus supporting a causal interpretation of
our results. That is, the introduction of the exception precedes employment changes and not vice
17The dynamic estimations also include a second set of lead and lag variables to account for the four cases in
which legal exceptions were formally abandoned. The inclusion or exclusion of these additional regressors does not
materially in￿ uence the reported results.
14versa. By contrast, the public policy and implied contract leads and lags have typically positive
coe¢ cients. The pattern for the public policy doctrine is particularly noteworthy since it suggests
that the unexpected positive estimate for the impact of this doctrine on employment ￿ uctuations
found in Table 2 is likely to be spurious. These patterns are robust to the inclusion of state-speci￿c
and industry-speci￿c trends. The results using the LBD suggest that the impact of the good faith
doctrine peaks approximately three years following adoption and that the long-term e⁄ect is in-
signi￿cant (i.e., six or more years following adoption). This pattern is comparable to Autor et al.
(2006), who report that the near-term e⁄ects of adoption of wrongful discharge doctrines dissipate
within approximately ￿ve years, perhaps because the initial market uncertainty about the poten-
tially vast￿ but ultimately modest scope￿ of the protections o⁄ered is resolved (cf. Edelman et al.
1992).18
Table 2￿ s results from the LBD suggest that manufacturing was particularly a⁄ected by the
introduction of wrongful discharge exceptions, likely because manufacturing employment is highly
seasonal and highly cyclical, making dismissal protections particularly costly.19 We use plant-level
data from the ASM to further examine the e⁄ects of employment protections in manufacturing.
Panel A of Table 3 presents analogous results to those using the LBD in Table 2. Because our ASM
sample uses a balanced panel of ongoing plants, we can now add plant ￿xed e⁄ects to the prior
speci￿cation, leading to the following estimating equation:
ABSpt = ￿p + ￿t + ￿GFGFst￿1 + ￿PPPPst￿1 + ￿ICICst￿1 + "pt: (3)
The dependent variable is the absolute year-to-year employment change in plant p from t ￿ 1 to
t; ￿p is a plant ￿xed e⁄ect. As before, we include state-speci￿c and industry-speci￿c trends. The
estimated standard errors again allow for error correlations across plants within states and within
states over time.20
18Only 13 states introduced good faith exceptions during the period studied. California introduced the ￿rst good
faith exception in a highly visible court ruling. Though our basic and dynamic LBD results on employment changes
are strongest for the full sample of states, the results are qualitatively similar but less precise when California is
excluded.
19The mean year-to-year turnover in manufacturing was 12%, compared to 10% in construction, 6% in wholesale
trade, 7% in retail trade, and 8% in services. Only mining had a higher annual turnover (27%). Regressions examining
the mining sector also ￿nd a substantial dampening of annual employment volatility following the adoption of the
good faith exception.
20We have also estimated analogous models using an unbalanced panel of ASM plants (i.e., not limited to those
15Consistent with the LBD, the results using the ASM suggest that the good faith exception
reduces employment ￿ uctuations. We do not ￿nd evidence, however, in the ASM sample that the
implied contract or public policy doctrines impact employment ￿ uctuations. We estimate in Table
3A that the good faith exception reduces employment ￿ uctuations by 1.5 to 4.5 percent, which
is about half the size of the estimate using the LBD data. While this ￿nding is only marginally
statistically signi￿cant, supporting evidence from dynamic speci￿cations below suggest that the
e⁄ect is likely to be causal.
The di⁄erence between the LBD and ASM results are explained in part by the fact that in the
ASM we can control for additional unobservable factors a⁄ecting a plant￿ s employment ￿ uctuations.
Contrasting Columns (4) and (6), with and without plant ￿xed e⁄ects, we can see that excluding
plant e⁄ects using our ASM sample implies a reduction of 5 percent in employment ￿ uctuations as
opposed to 2 percent with plant e⁄ects. As is shown in the next sections, the remaining di⁄erences
between the estimates in the LBD and the ASM samples are likely due to the fact that the LBD
includes entering and exiting business while the ASM sample is composed of a balanced sample of
ongoing plants. The ASM analysis therefore excludes any e⁄ect of wrongful discharge protections
on employment ￿ uctuations occurring through entry and exit.
As with the LBD, we also estimate a dynamic speci￿cation using ASM data. Table 3B presents
these estimates. Similar to the patterns found with the LBD, leads of the good faith exception are
found to have weakly positive and insigni￿cant e⁄ects on employment ￿ uctuations while lags of the
good faith exception have negative e⁄ects on employment changes. The maximum dampening is
again attained three years following adoption. As with the LBD estimates, the long-term impacts
are insigni￿cant and, in the case of the ASM, weakly positive.21
Since employment protections may also a⁄ect seasonal employment ￿ uctuations (cf. Wolfers
2005), we also study a quarterly employment churn measure to complement the year-over-year
changes. In particular, we estimate equation (3) using as a dependent variable the following measure
continually operating). Findings from these models, which are qualitatively similar, are available from the authors
on request.
21As for the LBD results, the ASM ￿ndings are qualitatively similar but somewhat less precise when we exclude
California from our sample. As a complement to the panel estimations, similar results are found with lagged dependent
variable speci￿cations that test for mean reversion.












pt are the maximum and the minimum quarterly production-worker em-
ployment in plant p in year t, respectively. As before we allow for state-speci￿c and industry-speci￿c
trends and cluster the standard errors on state.
Panel B of Table 3A shows results for these speci￿cations. Estimates without state trends show
negative e⁄ects of the good faith exception on seasonal adjustments of production workers, but
the results are not signi￿cant and the e⁄ects become positive when controlling for state trends.
Looking deeper, however, the results from the underlying dynamic speci￿cations reported in Table
3C consistently show weakly positive coe¢ cients on the leads and negative coe¢ cients on the
lags. Moreover, the dampening is again most signi￿cant three years after the adoption. Thus,
the dynamic speci￿cations appear most consistent with a signi￿cant causal e⁄ect of the good faith
exception on seasonal employment ￿ uctuations over the short-run to medium-run.
5.2 E⁄ects on Entry and Exit
The di⁄erence in the magnitudes of the estimated e⁄ects of wrongful discharge exceptions on
employment ￿ uctuations in the LBD and the ASM samples suggests that part of the reduction in
employment ￿ uctuations observed following adoption of the good faith exception is explained by
changes in ￿rm entry and exit (i.e., the extensive employment margin). To evaluate the importance
of external adjustment, we use the LBD to estimate regressions similar to equation (1), where the
dependent variable is the log of the average count of plants over ￿ve-year intervals among continuing,
entering and exiting businesses. We use ￿ve-year averages to minimize the possibility of capturing
spurious entry and exit due to ￿ ghosting￿and reporting bumps observed surrounding Census years.
The wrongful discharge indicators take the value of one if the exceptions had been adopted as of
the midpoint of the ￿ve-year intervals.23
22The ASM does not collect quarterly employment for non-production workers. The plant-level ASM does not
allow us to separately estimate employment e⁄ects by demographic group, as is feasible with data from household
surveys as in Kahn (2006).
23Annual regressions of entry and exit yield quantitatively similar results, though the magnitudes are smaller.
Studying entry and exit at ￿ve-year intervals avoids spurious peaks of entry and exit rates surrounding Census years,
17Panels A through D of Table 4 report results of these regressions for total, continuing, entering
and exiting plants, respectively. Panel A shows little change in the total count of plants in response
to the introduction of any of the exceptions. However, Panels B through D show that in the case
of the good faith exception, this re￿ ects countervailing forces among continuing and other plants.
Panel B shows an increase in plant survival after the introduction of good faith exceptions, though
this e⁄ect is only marginally signi￿cant. Panel C shows that entry is substantially reduced in
manufacturing after the introduction of good faith exceptions, though exit is una⁄ected. These
results, controlling for state-speci￿c and industry-speci￿c trends, suggest a reduction of 7.7 log
points in the number of entering plants, where log points refer to 100 times the coe¢ cient in the
log-linear speci￿cation (thus roughly corresponding to percentage point changes).24 This translates
into a reduction of about 9,000 establishments. By contrast, the public policy and implied contract
exceptions do not appear to a⁄ect entry.
In combination with the ￿ndings in Tables 2 and 3, these results suggest that the dampening
e⁄ect of the good faith exception on employment ￿ uctuations operates through two channels: a
reduction in net employment ￿ ows in ongoing plants and a reduction in the entry of new plants. The
reduced rate of establishment creation helps reconcile the smaller decline in employment ￿ uctuations
evident in the ASM panel compared to the LBD.25
5.3 E⁄ects on Employment Levels
Here we explore the e⁄ects of wrongful discharge exceptions on employment levels. As discussed,
the e⁄ect of these dismissal protections on net employment is theoretically ambiguous (at least in
the short run) since both dismissals and hiring are a⁄ected.
We start by estimating similar regressions to equation (3) using the ASM data, but where
the dependent variable is the log of employment in plant p at time t. Table 5 presents results of
when additional manpower is devoted to updating the business registry. This updating has a noticeable e⁄ect on
establishment counts, but not on summed employment levels used for year-to-year employment changes. Entry and
exit are de￿ned as the ￿rst and last year an establishment is observed in the LBD, respectively, with the end years of
the sample excluded. Establishments alive for a single year are recorded as both entering and exiting. This procedure
ignores potential exit and re-entry by establishments, but more importantly avoids spurious entry and exit from
￿ ghosting￿establishments with poor longitudinal linkages.
24This result is consistent with Kugler and Pica (forthcoming), who ￿nd that increased dismissal costs in Italy
after the 1990 labor market reform reduced entry of small ￿rms.
25See Koeniger and Prat (2006) for analysis of product market regulation and the extensive margin.
18these regressions for total employment as well as for production and non-production employment
separately. Panel A shows that total employment increases with the introduction of the good
faith and public policy exceptions, though the public policy results are insigni￿cant. The implied
contract exception has a negative though insigni￿cant e⁄ect on employment, which is consistent in
sign and magnitude￿ though not statistical signi￿cance￿ with the ￿ndings in Autor et al. (2004
and 2006).
When employment is disaggregated into production and non-production workers, we ￿nd that
the increase in total employment following the introduction of the good faith exception is driven
primarily by the increase in employment of non-production workers. For example, the ￿nal columns
of Panels B and C suggest that production employment does not react to the introduction of
the good faith exception while non-production employment in the typical plant increases by 4.8
log points following the introduction of this exception.26 This di⁄erential rise in non-production
demand may be explained by capital-skill complementarity (cf. Griliches 1969; Berman et al.
1994), as Section (5:4) will show that the adoption of the good faith exception may have spurred
capital-deepening in ￿rms.
As before we also estimate dynamic speci￿cations to test whether our ￿ndings are consistent
with a causal interpretation. In these speci￿cations, found in Appendix Table 2, the estimated
impact of the good faith exception on employment levels commences a year prior to adoption and
becomes puzzlingly large in subsequent years when state-speci￿c trends are included, exceeding
10 log points in years six forward. This pattern is very unlikely to re￿ ect a causal relationship
and suggests the presence of confounding shocks. A potential explanation is that California and
Arizona, the two largest states that adopted a good faith exception, experienced unusually strong
employment growth in the late 1980s, likely for reasons unrelated to this particular legal doctrine.27
The results for the public policy exception have inconsistent signs across speci￿cations and show
no evidence of a trend break after adoption of the doctrine. By contrast, results for the implied
26These results are robust to various speci￿cations and to the exclusion of California and Arizona, even though
Arizona had unusually high employment growth during the 1980s and 1990s.
27In fact, excluding California from the estimates largely eliminates the estimated positive employment e⁄ects of
the good faith exception. However, California is arguably the strongest test-case for evaluating the labor market
impact of this exception since the Cleary decision is the landmark case among good faith rulings. We are accordingly
reluctant to remove California from the sample. Excluding Arizona reduces but does not eliminate the estimated
positive employment e⁄ect.
19contract exception show consistently negative e⁄ects for both leads and lags, though the lead e⁄ects
are smaller.
Table 6 shows results from regressions similar to equation (1) using LBD data, but where the
dependent variable is the log of average manufacturing employment in state s and industry j over
￿ve-year intervals and where the wrongful discharge indicators take the value of 1 if the exceptions
had been adopted as of the midpoint of the ￿ve-year intervals. Panel A presents results for all plants,
while Panels B through D present results for continuing, entering and exiting plants, respectively.28
Consistent with the results from the ASM, which includes only continuing plants, we ￿nd that
total employment in the LBD sample increased by about 7.8 log points following the adoption
the good faith exception. Examining employment separately for continuing, entering and exiting
plants in Panels B through D shows that this growth is driven by continuing plants. Panel B shows
a signi￿cant increase in employment of 8.3 log points in continuing plants, while Panels C and
D show a marginal decline in employment created by plant entry and an increase in employment
lost due to plant exit, although these two e⁄ects are not statistically signi￿cant. Note also the
close comparability of the estimated e⁄ects of the good faith exception on employment levels in the
ASM sample (Table 5, Panel A) and on employment levels in ongoing plants in the LBD (Table
6, Panel B). This pattern is expected since the ASM sample is composed exclusively of ongoing
plants. In summary, the net growth of employment that we observe after adoption of the good faith
exception is accounted for by reduced job creation in entering plants and increased job destruction
in exiting plans￿ both of which led to reduced employment￿ accompanied by more than o⁄setting
employment growth in ongoing plants.
As with the ASM, the dynamic speci￿cations in Appendix Table 3 show positive coe¢ cients
on the good faith exception￿ s leads and implausibly large positive coe¢ cients on the lags, making
questionable a causal interpretation of the e⁄ects on employment. The results for the public policy
and implied contract doctrines are comparable to the prior estimates.29
28Annual employment regressions yield quantitatively similar results, though the magnitudes of the coe¢ cients are
smaller. We use employment at ￿ve-year intervals here to keep consistency with the results on the counts of entering
and exiting plants presented in the previous section.
29Table 6 also shows economically large, although inconsistent, e⁄ects of the public policy exception on employment
levels. Similar to earlier studies, this pattern raises puzzles about the interpretation between the public policy
exception and employment.
205.4 Productivity E⁄ects
The ￿nding that the good faith exception reduces job ￿ ows is consistent with the expectation that
this discharge protection raises ￿rms￿adjustments costs. Here we explore the consequences of this
rise in adjustment costs on other margins of non-labor adjustment. One such margin is capital
substitution; if discharge protections raise the e⁄ective price of labor by making it more expensive
to hire and ￿re, ￿rms may substitute towards other inputs. Second, given the restrictions on ￿rms￿
ability to adjust, we also may expect total factor productivity to be a⁄ected￿ though as noted in
Section (3), compositional shifts in worker hiring following the adoption of dismissal protections
may generate countervailing e⁄ects on labor productivity.
We begin by examining whether productivity was a⁄ected by employment protections due to
changes in input composition. In particular, we ask whether the introduction of employment
protections a⁄ected capital investment and, subsequently, capital-labor ratios. Panels A and B of
Table 7 report results of speci￿cations similar to equations (1) and (3) without and with state-
speci￿c and industry-speci￿c trends, but where the dependent variables are the log of total capital
investment and the log of the capital-labor ratio.
Capital stocks are measured at the beginning-of-year and constructed using the perpetual in-
ventory method. Capital stocks are separately calculated for machinery and structures and then
aggregated for total capital metrics. The capital stock of plant p in industry j at time t is:











where initial capital stocks in 1972 are obtained by de￿ ating book values of capital by BEA two-
digit SIC de￿ ators for installed capital. New equipment investments, IN
pt￿1, are de￿ ated with NBER
four-digit SIC new-capital de￿ ators, PN
Ijt￿1. Used equipment purchases, IU
pt￿1, employ the NBER
four-digit SIC de￿ ators lagged three periods. The annual depreciation rates, ￿jt￿1, are obtained
from the BEA by two-digit SIC industries.
Panel A of Table 7 shows a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect of the introduction of the good faith
exception on total investment (machinery and structures) of 6.5 log points (Column 6) but show
no e⁄ects from the introduction of the public policy and implied contract exceptions. Dynamic
speci￿cations in Appendix Table 4 indicate that capital investment peaks several years after adop-
21tion of the good faith exception and then declines somewhat thereafter (a pattern similar to the
results for employment ￿ uctuations). However, leads of the good faith adoption variable in the dy-
namic speci￿cations are notably negative (though statistically insigni￿cant), suggesting that part
of the post-adoption rise in capital investment may re￿ ect an investment rebound from an earlier
downturn.
Not surprisingly given the increase in employment levels, Panel B of Table 7 shows mixed￿
albeit generally positive￿ e⁄ects of the good faith exception on capital-labor ratios. For example,
estimated e⁄ects are negative when controlling for state-speci￿c trends but become positive when
controlling for plant e⁄ects. Dynamic speci￿cations in Appendix Table 5 ￿nd negative coe¢ cients
on both leads and lags, raising the question of whether the introduction of the good faith exception
followed rather than preceded increases in the capital-labor ratio.
To explore e⁄ects on productivity, Panel A of Table 8 presents results of speci￿cations like
equations (1) and (3), but where the dependent variables is a TFP measure estimated using a
production function residual methodology. For the residuals methodology, we ￿rst estimate the
following production function in logs for each two-digit SIC industry and year using ordinary least
squares:
log(Ypt) = ￿ + &jt log(Lpt) + ￿jt log(Hpt) + ￿M
jt log(KM
pt ) + ￿S
jt log(KS
pt) + ￿pt;
where Ypt is value added (i.e., total value of shipments net of materials/fuels costs and inventory
adjustments) in plant p at time t de￿ ated using the NBER four-digit SIC shipments de￿ ators, Lpt
is the count of production or unskilled workers, and Hpt is the count of non-production or skilled
workers. KM
pt and KS
pt are the separated machinery and structures capital stocks, respectively. The
residuals from the regression above provide our TFP measure:
TFPpt = log(Ypt) ￿b &jt log(Lpt) ￿ b ￿jt log(Hpt) ￿b ￿
M
jt log(KM




The results in Table 8 show a uniformly negative and generally signi￿cant e⁄ect of the introduc-
tion of the good faith exception on TFP, though the e⁄ect is slightly attenuated when we control
for plant e⁄ects. By contrast, the public policy exception appears to have a positive e⁄ect and
the implied contract exception appears to have a negative e⁄ect, though neither is signi￿cant in
22any speci￿cation.30 However, results from dynamic speci￿cations reported in Appendix Table 6
show mostly negative coe¢ cients for both leads and lags of the good faith exception, though the
coe¢ cients on the lags are substantially larger. The dynamic speci￿cation thus raises some ques-
tion about a causal interpretation of the good faith e⁄ects on productivity, though the available
evidence is mostly consistent with a reduction in TFP in the four years following adoption of the
good faith exception.
Finally, Panel B of Table 8 explores whether the increase in capital investment following the
introduction of the good faith exception found in Table 7 a⁄ected labor productivity. We estimate
that labor productivity rose substantially (by 1 to 4 log points) following adoption of the good
faith exception. This measured rise in labor productivity follows from the fact that both capital
investment and non-production worker employment (Tables 5 and 7) rose after adoption of the
good faith exception. Since our labor productivity measure does not adjust for the quality of labor
inputs, the rise in raw labor productivity is likely to re￿ ect a mixture of capital deepening and
compositional shifts in labor quality. Thus, this ￿nding is not at odds with the conclusion that the
good faith exception reduced TFP. Results from dynamic speci￿cations for labor productivity that
control for plant e⁄ects (Appendix Table 7) show negative coe¢ cients on the leads and positive
though insigni￿cant coe¢ cients on the lags, suggesting that the good faith exception preceded the
increase in labor productivity.
6 Conclusions
This paper makes two contributions. The ￿rst is to exploit microdata to examine the e⁄ect of
dismissal protections on establishment-level outcomes in a representative sample of employers. The
second is to consider simultaneously the e⁄ects of these protections on job ￿ ows￿ where there
are unambiguous theoretical implications￿ and on several other important (and mostly unstud-
30We also examined a cost-shares methodology to analyze TFP. Cost shares were estimated for three-digit SIC
industries from the NBER productivity database (cf. Bartelsman and Gray 1996). Production worker, non-production
worker, and materials and fuels cost shares are calculated relative to TVS; the cost share of capital is a residual such
that the cost shares sum to one. The results of the TFP measure obtained using a cost-shares methodology are
generally declining but more mixed. However, the cost-shares methodology presents several disadvantages: 1) the
coe¢ cients on the shares are out-of-sample estimates obtained using NBER data; 2) we cannot disaggregate between
equipment and structures since the capital share is obtained as a residual; and 3) the cost-shares methodology assumes
constant returns-to-scale in the production function and perfectly competitive input markets.
23ied) margins of ￿rm behavior, including capital investment, labor productivity and total factor
productivity, where the predictions of theory are less clear cut. We believe that the power of the
analysis derives from the evidence that the adoption of one particular dismissal protection, the
good faith exception to employment-at-will, reduced employment ￿ uctuations in adopting states.
These e⁄ects were largest in the ￿rst three years following adoption and diminished thereafter. This
￿nding indicates that adjustment costs rose in the short-run, a necessary condition for there to be
an impact on economic e¢ ciency.
The ￿nding on employment ￿ uctuations motivates us to analyze how this short-run rise in
adjustment costs impacted ￿rms￿choices of capital and labor inputs, and ultimately, their produc-
tivity. The most surprising result of our analysis is that the increase in adjustment costs appears
to have spurred capital and skill deepening￿ that is, ￿rms raised capital investment and increased
non-production worker employment. These changes in input choices led to a rise in measured (non-
quality-adjusted) labor productivity and a decline in total factor productivity. This last ￿nding is
potentially quite important because, if correct, it provides con￿rmation that exogenous increases
in adjustment costs reduce e¢ ciency.
Our ￿ndings also present two unresolved puzzles. First, the adoption of the good faith exception
appears to follow (likely by coincidence) a major investment downturn. This pattern reduces
our con￿dence in the causal interpretation of the rise in capital investment following adoption
of the good faith exception. The second puzzle is that the estimated positive e⁄ect of the good
faith exception on employment levels is larger than appears plausible (albeit often imprecisely
estimated). In light of these puzzles, we view our ￿ndings as suggestive but inconclusive. Though
our data support the hypothesis that adoption of the good faith exception raises adjustment costs,
the anomalous results for employment levels suggests a cautious interpretation of the ￿ndings until
further evidence accumulates.
Our results have interesting parallels with those of a recent study by Acemoglu and Finkelstein
(2005) of ￿rm-level responses to changes in labor costs in the U.S. hospital industry. Responding
to a change in Medicare reimbursement policy in the 1980s that e⁄ectively increased the cost of
labor relative to capital, Acemoglu-Finkelstein document that hospitals raised both their capital-
labor ratios and the skill composition of their workforces. Acemoglu-Finkelstein suggest that this
24result may be explained by either capital-skill complementarity or technology-skill complementarity
(assuming that new capital investments embed recent technologies), as in our discussion above.
While the Acemoglu-Finkelstein ￿ndings are drawn from a distinctly di⁄erent economic context
than our study (i.e., a heavily regulated sector versus a relatively competitive sector) and exploit
a di⁄erent source of policy variation (i.e., employment subsidies rather than dismissal costs), the
parallels with our ￿ndings for the e⁄ect of dismissal protections on the U.S. manufacturing sector
are nonetheless intriguing and deserving of further consideration.
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28Figure 1: Count of States Recognizing Exceptions to Employment-at-Will, 




























































Public Policy Exception Implied Contract Exception Good Faith ExceptionGood Public Implied Never All
Annual Means of Variable Faith Policy Contract Covered States
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Employment Change 13% 11% 11% 10% 11%
     % Positive Change 57% 58% 58% 60% 58%
Surveyed Employment 15,078,526 55,598,270 56,151,488 5,387,148 68,091,479
     % Manufacturing 25% 28% 28% 21% 28%
     % Mining 1% 1% 1% 0% 1%
     % Construction 7% 7% 7% 8% 7%
     % Wholesale Trade 8% 8% 8% 9% 8%
     % Retail Trade 26% 26% 26% 29% 26%
     % Services 32% 29% 30% 32% 30%
     % in Entering Establishments 8% 7% 7% 8% 7%
     % in Exiting Establishements 7% 6% 6% 7% 6%
     % Part of Multi-Unit Firms 53% 56% 55% 53% 55%
Surveyed Establishments 869,860 3,106,760 3,188,694 333,504 3,871,392
     Establishment Entry Rate 14% 13% 13% 15% 13%
     Establishment Exit Rate 12% 11% 11% 12% 11%
     % Part of Multi-Unit Firms 21% 23% 22% 23% 22%
Maximum States 12 43 43 3 50
Plant Employment Change 11% 11% 11% 10% 11%
     % Positive Change 49% 49% 49% 50% 49%
Plant Employment  790 747 766 658 746
     % Non-Production Workers 32% 26% 27% 25% 26%
% Part of Multi-Unit Firm 98% 98% 98% 97% 98%
Total  Installed  Capital  (m) $33 $30 $31 $27 $31 
Total  Investment  (m) $1.9 $1.7 $1.7 $1.5 $1.7 
Labor  Productivity  (k) $88 $86 $87 $78 $85 
Maximum Plants 794 4,848 4,601 323 5,666
Notes: Annual means for Columns 1-3 are calculated over all observations covered by the listed exception during the sample 
period, including any pre-coverage and post-coverage periods.  Figures employ NBER deflators as described in text and are 
presented in 1999 dollars.
Covered by Exceptions
A.  LBD State-SIC2 Panel
Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics for LBD and ASM, 1976-1999
B. ASM Manufacturing Plant PanelLegal State FE, Col. 1 plus Col. 1 plus Col. 1 plus
Exception SIC2 FE, State Trends SIC2-YR FE State Trends,
 YR FE SIC2-YR FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Good -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 -0.005
Faith (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Public 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.004
Policy (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Implied 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002
Contract (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Obs. 51,074 51,074 51,074 51,074
Good -0.009 -0.016 -0.006 -0.013
Faith (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007)
Public 0.006 0.010 0.006 0.011
Policy (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Implied 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.005
Contract (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Obs. 21,418 21,418 21,418 21,418
Table 2: Effects of Employment-at-Will Doctrines on
LBD Annual Employment Changes, 1976-1999
Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors clustered on state reported in parentheses.
A. LBD Absolute Annual Employment Changes, Full Sample
B. LBD Absolute Annual Employment Changes, Mfg. OnlyLegal State FE, Col. 1 plus Col. 1 plus Col. 1 plus Plant FE, Col. 5 plus
Exception SIC2 FE, State Trends SIC2-YR FE State Trends, YR FE State Trends,
 YR FE SIC2-YR FE SIC2-YR FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Good -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 -0.006 -0.002
Faith (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Public 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001
Policy (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Implied 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.001
Contract (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Obs. 135,937 135,937 135,937 135,937 135,937 135,937
Good -0.005 0.005 -0.003 0.006 -0.004 0.004
Faith (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.003)
Public 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.004
Policy (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Implied -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002
Contract (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Obs. 135,976 135,976 135,976 135,976 135,976 135,976
Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors clustered on state reported in parentheses.
B. ASM Production Worker Quarterly Churn
Table 3A: Effects of Employment-at-Will Doctrines on
ASM Annual and Quarterly Employment Changes, 1976-1999
A. ASM Absolute Annual Employment ChangesLegal
Exception
∆ GF t+2 0.011 (0.011) 0.014 (0.010) 0.008 (0.011) 0.013 (0.010) 0.009 (0.010) 0.010 (0.011)
∆ GF t+1 0.006 (0.011) 0.010 (0.011) 0.005 (0.011) 0.010 (0.010) 0.004 (0.011) 0.007 (0.010)
∆ GF 0.004 (0.006) 0.009 (0.007) 0.001 (0.005) 0.006 (0.006) 0.001 (0.006) 0.003 (0.005)
∆ GF t-1 0.004 (0.006) 0.010 (0.007) 0.002 (0.006) 0.009 (0.007) 0.001 (0.006) 0.004 (0.005)
∆ GF t-2 -0.001 (0.005) 0.005 (0.007) -0.003 (0.005) 0.004 (0.006) -0.004 (0.005) 0.000 (0.005)
∆ GF t-3 -0.017 (0.006) -0.010 (0.007) -0.016 (0.007) -0.008 (0.008) -0.021 (0.006) -0.013 (0.006)
∆ GF t-4 -0.013 (0.007) -0.005 (0.007) -0.012 (0.007) -0.004 (0.006) -0.016 (0.007) -0.009 (0.005)
∆ GF t-5 -0.007 (0.007) 0.003 (0.006) -0.005 (0.007) 0.004 (0.005) -0.010 (0.007) -0.002 (0.006)
GF Lag t-6  0.001 (0.006) 0.015 (0.008) 0.002 (0.006) 0.015 (0.006) -0.002 (0.006) 0.005 (0.005)
∆ PP t+2 -0.005 (0.004) -0.003 (0.004) -0.005 (0.004) -0.004 (0.004) -0.005 (0.004) -0.005 (0.004)
∆ PP t+1 0.000 (0.002) 0.002 (0.003) -0.001 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003) 0.000 (0.002) -0.001 (0.003)
∆ PP 0.005 (0.003) 0.008 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003) 0.006 (0.003) 0.005 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003)
∆ PP t-1 0.005 (0.003) 0.008 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003) 0.006 (0.003) 0.005 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003)
∆ PP t-2 0.001 (0.004) 0.005 (0.005) -0.002 (0.003) 0.002 (0.004) 0.001 (0.004) -0.002 (0.003)
∆ PP t-3 0.003 (0.003) 0.006 (0.004) 0.001 (0.003) 0.004 (0.004) 0.002 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003)
∆ PP t-4 0.007 (0.003) 0.010 (0.004) 0.003 (0.003) 0.006 (0.004) 0.006 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003)
∆ PP t-5 0.001 (0.003) 0.005 (0.004) -0.003 (0.003) 0.001 (0.004) 0.000 (0.003) -0.003 (0.003)
PP Lag t-6  0.004 (0.004) 0.010 (0.005) 0.001 (0.003) 0.007 (0.004) 0.003 (0.004) 0.001 (0.003)
∆ IC t+2 0.002 (0.004) 0.004 (0.004) 0.001 (0.003) 0.003 (0.004) 0.001 (0.004) 0.001 (0.004)
∆ IC t+1 -0.002 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003) -0.001 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003) -0.002 (0.003) -0.001 (0.003)
∆ IC 0.004 (0.004) 0.007 (0.004) 0.004 (0.003) 0.007 (0.004) 0.003 (0.004) 0.004 (0.004)
∆ IC t-1 0.003 (0.004) 0.007 (0.005) 0.003 (0.004) 0.006 (0.005) 0.003 (0.004) 0.002 (0.004)
∆ IC t-2 0.007 (0.004) 0.012 (0.005) 0.008 (0.003) 0.012 (0.005) 0.006 (0.003) 0.008 (0.003)
∆ IC t-3 0.003 (0.003) 0.008 (0.005) 0.002 (0.003) 0.007 (0.004) 0.002 (0.004) 0.002 (0.003)
∆ IC t-4 -0.003 (0.004) 0.003 (0.005) -0.002 (0.003) 0.002 (0.005) -0.004 (0.004) -0.002 (0.003)
∆ IC t-5 -0.003 (0.004) 0.004 (0.005) -0.001 (0.003) 0.004 (0.005) -0.003 (0.004) -0.001 (0.004)
IC Lag t-6 -0.003 (0.004) 0.006 (0.006) -0.001 (0.003) 0.005 (0.006) -0.004 (0.004) -0.001 (0.003)
Obs.
Table 3B: Dynamic Effects of Employment-at-Will Doctrines on














Col. 1 plus Col. 1 plus
Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors clustered on state reported in parentheses.
Plant FE,





∆ GF t+2 -0.003 (0.011) 0.008 (0.007) -0.005 (0.010) 0.006 (0.007) -0.001 (0.011) 0.003 (0.007)
∆ GF t+1 0.009 (0.015) 0.024 (0.017) 0.006 (0.014) 0.020 (0.017) 0.011 (0.015) 0.015 (0.014)
∆ GF -0.026 (0.014) -0.011 (0.013) -0.027 (0.013) -0.013 (0.012) -0.025 (0.014) -0.019 (0.008)
∆ GF t-1 -0.017 (0.015) 0.000 (0.011) -0.018 (0.013) -0.002 (0.010) -0.015 (0.015) -0.009 (0.007)
∆ GF t-2 -0.015 (0.014) 0.005 (0.011) -0.011 (0.014) 0.006 (0.010) -0.013 (0.014) 0.000 (0.008)
∆ GF t-3 -0.029 (0.015) -0.008 (0.011) -0.025 (0.013) -0.007 (0.010) -0.027 (0.016) -0.014 (0.007)
∆ GF t-4 0.014 (0.017) 0.036 (0.011) 0.020 (0.016) 0.039 (0.013) 0.016 (0.018) 0.032 (0.010)
∆ GF t-5 -0.002 (0.029) 0.021 (0.019) 0.003 (0.027) 0.022 (0.017) 0.000 (0.030) 0.015 (0.021)
GF Lag t-6  -0.011 (0.014) 0.013 (0.013) -0.009 (0.013) 0.011 (0.013) -0.008 (0.014) 0.002 (0.007)
∆ PP t+2 -0.003 (0.005) -0.004 (0.005) -0.004 (0.005) -0.006 (0.005) -0.003 (0.005) -0.003 (0.005)
∆ PP t+1 0.006 (0.006) 0.003 (0.005) 0.002 (0.004) -0.001 (0.005) 0.006 (0.006) 0.003 (0.005)
∆ PP 0.004 (0.008) 0.000 (0.007) -0.001 (0.007) -0.004 (0.007) 0.004 (0.008) 0.001 (0.007)
∆ PP t-1 0.003 (0.006) -0.003 (0.006) 0.000 (0.005) -0.005 (0.006) 0.003 (0.006) 0.001 (0.005)
∆ PP t-2 0.005 (0.006) -0.001 (0.006) 0.001 (0.005) -0.003 (0.006) 0.004 (0.006) 0.003 (0.005)
∆ PP t-3 0.009 (0.006) 0.003 (0.006) 0.004 (0.005) -0.001 (0.006) 0.009 (0.007) 0.006 (0.005)
∆ PP t-4 0.011 (0.007) 0.005 (0.007) 0.005 (0.006) 0.001 (0.007) 0.010 (0.008) 0.008 (0.007)
∆ PP t-5 0.007 (0.008) 0.001 (0.007) 0.005 (0.006) 0.000 (0.007) 0.007 (0.008) 0.007 (0.006)
PP Lag t-6  0.009 (0.008) 0.005 (0.008) 0.004 (0.006) 0.001 (0.007) 0.009 (0.008) 0.008 (0.006)
∆ IC t+2 0.005 (0.006) 0.005 (0.006) 0.005 (0.005) 0.004 (0.005) 0.005 (0.006) 0.005 (0.005)
∆ IC t+1 0.001 (0.005) 0.000 (0.005) 0.004 (0.005) 0.002 (0.005) 0.001 (0.005) 0.004 (0.006)
∆ IC -0.004 (0.006) -0.006 (0.007) -0.006 (0.006) -0.009 (0.006) -0.004 (0.006) -0.007 (0.006)
∆ IC t-1 0.003 (0.006) 0.001 (0.006) 0.003 (0.006) -0.001 (0.006) 0.003 (0.006) 0.002 (0.006)
∆ IC t-2 -0.001 (0.006) -0.002 (0.007) 0.000 (0.005) -0.004 (0.006) -0.001 (0.006) -0.001 (0.005)
∆ IC t-3 -0.004 (0.006) -0.005 (0.005) -0.003 (0.005) -0.007 (0.005) -0.004 (0.006) -0.003 (0.005)
∆ IC t-4 -0.007 (0.006) -0.007 (0.006) -0.005 (0.005) -0.008 (0.006) -0.007 (0.006) -0.005 (0.005)
∆ IC t-5 -0.003 (0.008) -0.003 (0.007) -0.001 (0.006) -0.005 (0.006) -0.003 (0.008) -0.001 (0.006)
IC Lag t-6 -0.006 (0.007) -0.003 (0.007) -0.003 (0.005) -0.006 (0.006) -0.006 (0.007) -0.003 (0.005)
Obs.
Table 3C: Dynamic Effects of Employment-at-Will Doctrines on
 ASM Production Worker Quarterly Churn, 1976-1999
Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors clustered on state reported in parentheses.
Plant FE,




Col. 1 plus Col. 1 plus Col. 5 plus
(2) (5)
Col. 1 plus









(1)Legal State FE, Col. 1 plus Col. 1 plus Col. 1 plus
Exception SIC2 FE, State Trends SIC2-YR FE State Trends,
 YR FE SIC2-YR FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Good 0.027 0.026 0.003 0.020
Faith (0.023) (0.013) (0.032) (0.026)
Public 0.061 0.008 0.068 0.006
Policy (0.021) (0.006) (0.026) (0.023)
Implied -0.012 -0.017 -0.019 -0.017
Contract (0.019) (0.007) (0.025) (0.016)
Obs. 3,911 3,911 3,911 3,911
Good 0.047 0.040 0.021 0.035
Faith (0.027) (0.015) (0.036) (0.027)
Public 0.068 0.008 0.076 0.007
Policy (0.024) (0.007) (0.029) (0.024)
Implied -0.013 -0.015 -0.021 -0.015
Contract (0.022) (0.008) (0.027) (0.017)
Obs. 3,891 3,891 3,891 3,891
Good -0.117 -0.068 -0.131 -0.077
Faith (0.031) (0.028) (0.032) (0.034)
Public 0.016 -0.011 0.015 -0.019
Policy (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.033)
Implied -0.021 -0.030 -0.016 -0.030
Contract (0.024) (0.031) (0.028) (0.034)
Obs. 3,846 3,846 3,846 3,846
Good 0.011 0.005 -0.012 -0.002
Faith (0.026) (0.034) (0.029) (0.043)
Public 0.063 0.048 0.068 0.042
Policy (0.018) (0.022) (0.023) (0.032)
Implied -0.006 -0.022 -0.009 -0.021
Contract (0.020) (0.022) (0.023) (0.025)
Obs. 3,862 3,862 3,862 3,862
D. LBD Mfg. Log Count of Exiting Plants
Notes:  Five-year blocks. Huber-White robust standard errors clustered on state-
year reported in parentheses. 
Table 4: Effects of Employment-at-Will Doctrines on
LBD Plant Counts, 1978-1997
A. LBD Mfg. Log Count of All Plants
B. LBD Mfg. Log Count of Continuing Plants
C. LBD Mfg. Log Count of Entering PlantsLegal State FE, Col. 1 plus Col. 1 plus Col. 1 plus Plant FE, Col. 5 plus
Exception SIC2 FE, State Trends SIC2-YR FE State Trends, YR FE State Trends,
 YR FE SIC2-YR FE SIC2-YR FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Good 0.025 0.079 0.015 0.068 0.033 0.020
Faith (0.033) (0.036) (0.030) (0.032) (0.031) (0.025)
Public 0.015 -0.002 0.014 -0.001 0.016 0.010
Policy (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.016) (0.013)
Implied -0.012 -0.011 -0.004 -0.005 -0.012 -0.009
Contract (0.018) (0.012) (0.015) (0.011) (0.018) (0.015)
Obs. 135,976 135,976 135,976 135,976 135,976 135,976
Good -0.002 0.083 -0.008 0.070 0.003 -0.002
Faith (0.034) (0.039) (0.030) (0.034) (0.032) (0.025)
Public 0.019 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.021 0.014
Policy (0.017) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.017) (0.013)
Implied -0.010 -0.011 0.001 -0.003 -0.009 -0.004
Contract (0.020) (0.013) (0.016) (0.012) (0.020) (0.016)
Obs. 135,932 135,932 135,932 135,932 135,932 135,932
Good 0.052 0.079 0.040 0.071 0.065 0.048
Faith (0.035) (0.026) (0.033) (0.025) (0.037) (0.035)
Public 0.012 -0.009 0.014 -0.005 0.009 0.008
Policy (0.018) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.018) (0.015)
Implied -0.014 -0.009 -0.008 -0.005 -0.018 -0.012
Contract (0.017) (0.011) (0.016) (0.011) (0.018) (0.015)
Obs. 135,232 135,232 135,232 135,232 135,232 135,232
Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors clustered on state reported in parentheses.
B. ASM Log Production Worker Employment
C. ASM Log Non-Production Worker Employment
Table 5: Effects of Employment-at-Will Doctrines on
ASM Employment Levels, 1976-1999
A. ASM Log Total EmploymentLegal State FE, Col. 1 plus Col. 1 plus Col. 1 plus
Exception SIC2 FE, State Trends SIC2-YR FE State Trends,
 YR FE SIC2-YR FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Good 0.061 0.092 0.045 0.078
Faith (0.044) (0.028) (0.053) (0.044)
Public 0.066 0.015 0.064 0.011
Policy (0.025) (0.016) (0.031) (0.032)
Implied -0.027 -0.009 -0.032 -0.012
Contract (0.028) (0.018) (0.033) (0.027)
Obs. 3,911 3,911 3,911 3,911
Good 0.067 0.096 0.051 0.083
Faith (0.045) (0.029) (0.054) (0.044)
Public 0.067 0.008 0.065 0.005
Policy (0.026) (0.016) (0.032) (0.032)
Implied -0.030 -0.015 -0.034 -0.017
Contract (0.028) (0.018) (0.033) (0.028)
Obs. 3,891 3,891 3,891 3,891
Good -0.004 0.014 -0.023 -0.001
Faith (0.048) (0.056) (0.053) (0.068)
Public 0.035 0.127 0.029 0.106
Policy (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.052)
Implied 0.021 0.123 0.020 0.113
Contract (0.045) (0.058) (0.046) (0.056)
Obs. 3,846 3,846 3,846 3,846
Good 0.073 0.075 0.048 0.066
Faith (0.048) (0.093) (0.056) (0.112)
Public 0.080 0.140 0.070 0.111
Policy (0.038) (0.050) (0.040) (0.056)
Implied 0.019 0.133 0.016 0.124
Contract (0.040) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045)
Obs. 3,862 3,862 3,862 3,862
Notes:  Five-year blocks. Huber-White robust standard errors clustered on state-
year reported in parentheses. 
Table 6: Effects of Employment-at-Will Doctrines on
LBD Employment Levels, 1978-1997
D. LBD Mfg. Log Empl. in Exiting Plants
A. LBD Mfg. Log Empl. in All Plants
B. LBD Mfg. Log Empl. in Continuing Plants
C. LBD Mfg. Log Empl. in Entering PlantsLegal State FE, Col. 1 plus Col. 1 plus Col. 1 plus Plant FE, Col. 5 plus
Exception SIC2 FE, State Trends SIC2-YR FE State Trends, YR FE State Trends,
 YR FE SIC2-YR FE SIC2-YR FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Good 0.087 0.146 0.059 0.122 0.092 0.065
Faith (0.037) (0.057) (0.034) (0.050) (0.035) (0.031)
Public 0.019 0.001 0.023 0.005 0.022 0.024
Policy (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
Implied 0.012 -0.002 0.011 0.003 0.009 0.005
Contract (0.020) (0.024) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
Obs. 133,608 133,608 133,608 133,608 133,608 133,608
Good 0.056 -0.022 0.034 -0.021 0.045 0.046
Faith (0.027) (0.024) (0.021) (0.024) (0.026) (0.012)
Public -0.028 0.000 -0.025 -0.003 -0.027 -0.020
Policy (0.019) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.019) (0.012)
Implied 0.024 0.016 0.011 0.008 0.020 0.011
Contract (0.021) (0.011) (0.015) (0.010) (0.021) (0.014)
Obs. 119,181 119,181 119,181 119,181 119,181 119,181
Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors clustered on state reported in parentheses.
Table 7: Effects of Employment-at-Will Doctrines on
ASM Capital Investment, 1976-1999
A. ASM Log Total Capital Investment
B. ASM Log Total Capital-Labor RatioLegal State FE, Col. 1 plus Col. 1 plus Col. 1 plus Plant FE, Col. 5 plus
Exception SIC2 FE, State Trends SIC2-YR FE State Trends, YR FE State Trends,
 YR FE SIC2-YR FE SIC2-YR FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Good -0.019 -0.023 -0.017 -0.022 -0.020 -0.014
Faith (0.014) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.015) (0.008)
Public 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.002
Policy (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008)
Implied -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006
Contract (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Obs. 110,881 110,881 110,881 110,881 110,881 110,881
Good 0.050 -0.004 0.051 0.002 0.039 0.044
Faith (0.018) (0.008) (0.015) (0.008) (0.017) (0.011)
Public -0.004 0.004 -0.008 0.005 -0.003 -0.008
Policy (0.010) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.011) (0.009)
Implied 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.006 -0.002 -0.002
Contract (0.011) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.011) (0.009)
Obs. 135,972 135,972 135,972 135,972 135,972 135,972
Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors clustered on state reported in parentheses. TFP is the establishment-level 
residual from a regression of value-added on four factors of production (production employment, non-production 
employment, machinery capital and structures capital) at the industry-year level.
Table 8: Effects of Employment-at-Will Doctrines on 
ASM Labor Productivity and Total Factor Productivity, 1976-1999
B. ASM Log Labor Productivity
A. ASM Total Factor ProductivityLegal
Exception
∆ GF t+2 0.009 (0.010) 0.008 (0.011) 0.008 (0.009) 0.007 (0.010)
∆ GF t+1 0.017 (0.010) 0.016 (0.011) 0.017 (0.009) 0.016 (0.010)
∆ GF 0.003 (0.009) 0.003 (0.010) 0.002 (0.009) 0.002 (0.010)
∆ GF t-1 -0.007 (0.009) -0.009 (0.010) -0.005 (0.008) -0.006 (0.010)
∆ GF t-2 -0.004 (0.010) -0.005 (0.011) -0.002 (0.009) -0.003 (0.010)
∆ GF t-3 -0.026 (0.011) -0.027 (0.014) -0.021 (0.011) -0.023 (0.012)
∆ GF t-4 -0.006 (0.011) -0.007 (0.013) -0.005 (0.011) -0.007 (0.012)
∆ GF t-5 -0.011 (0.008) -0.012 (0.009) -0.006 (0.008) -0.008 (0.008)
GF Lag t-6  -0.002 (0.008) -0.006 (0.010) 0.000 (0.007) -0.006 (0.009)
∆ PP t+2 -0.002 (0.006) 0.004 (0.006) -0.006 (0.005) 0.001 (0.005)
∆ PP t+1 0.005 (0.007) 0.013 (0.008) 0.003 (0.007) 0.012 (0.008)
∆ PP 0.003 (0.005) 0.013 (0.006) -0.001 (0.005) 0.010 (0.006)
∆ PP t-1 0.009 (0.005) 0.020 (0.005) 0.008 (0.004) 0.021 (0.005)
∆ PP t-2 0.007 (0.005) 0.020 (0.007) 0.004 (0.005) 0.019 (0.007)
∆ PP t-3 0.007 (0.006) 0.022 (0.007) 0.004 (0.005) 0.021 (0.006)
∆ PP t-4 0.012 (0.008) 0.029 (0.008) 0.010 (0.007) 0.028 (0.008)
∆ PP t-5 0.011 (0.005) 0.029 (0.007) 0.008 (0.004) 0.028 (0.006)
PP Lag t-6  0.012 (0.004) 0.037 (0.007) 0.009 (0.003) 0.034 (0.007)
∆ IC t+2 0.005 (0.006) 0.005 (0.006) 0.005 (0.006) 0.005 (0.006)
∆ IC t+1 0.005 (0.005) 0.005 (0.006) 0.006 (0.006) 0.006 (0.006)
∆ IC 0.008 (0.008) 0.007 (0.007) 0.007 (0.007) 0.007 (0.006)
∆ IC t-1 0.004 (0.006) 0.002 (0.005) 0.007 (0.006) 0.004 (0.005)
∆ IC t-2 0.011 (0.005) 0.009 (0.005) 0.014 (0.005) 0.013 (0.004)
∆ IC t-3 0.006 (0.006) 0.005 (0.007) 0.005 (0.006) 0.005 (0.007)
∆ IC t-4 0.006 (0.005) 0.005 (0.006) 0.006 (0.005) 0.006 (0.006)
∆ IC t-5 -0.001 (0.005) -0.001 (0.009) 0.001 (0.005) 0.002 (0.008)
IC Lag t-6 -0.001 (0.005) 0.000 (0.009) 0.001 (0.005) 0.003 (0.009)
Obs.




Col. 1 plus Col. 1 plus Col. 1 plus
State Trends, State Trends
Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors clustered on state reported in parentheses.
YR FE
(2)






∆ GF t+2 0.006 (0.021) 0.013 (0.008) 0.000 (0.020) 0.011 (0.008) 0.017 (0.021) 0.003 (0.021)
∆ GF t+1 0.034 (0.019) 0.043 (0.012) 0.027 (0.019) 0.042 (0.010) 0.039 (0.016) 0.021 (0.018)
∆ GF 0.061 (0.019) 0.080 (0.021) 0.054 (0.018) 0.077 (0.017) 0.068 (0.017) 0.050 (0.018)
∆ GF t-1 0.068 (0.021) 0.100 (0.023) 0.058 (0.020) 0.094 (0.018) 0.077 (0.019) 0.058 (0.022)
∆ GF t-2 0.068 (0.032) 0.122 (0.028) 0.058 (0.031) 0.114 (0.023) 0.078 (0.028) 0.055 (0.028)
∆ GF t-3 0.093 (0.035) 0.155 (0.029) 0.078 (0.032) 0.142 (0.024) 0.105 (0.031) 0.077 (0.029)
∆ GF t-4 0.083 (0.030) 0.156 (0.026) 0.066 (0.028) 0.140 (0.023) 0.096 (0.026) 0.062 (0.026)
∆ GF t-5 0.104 (0.036) 0.188 (0.029) 0.084 (0.034) 0.167 (0.024) 0.116 (0.032) 0.077 (0.034)
GF Lag t-6  0.042 (0.046) 0.213 (0.033) 0.031 (0.042) 0.189 (0.028) 0.053 (0.044) 0.027 (0.041)
∆ PP t+2 0.020 (0.016) -0.006 (0.011) 0.017 (0.013) -0.008 (0.009) 0.023 (0.016) 0.014 (0.013)
∆ PP t+1 0.021 (0.015) -0.016 (0.011) 0.012 (0.012) -0.024 (0.008) 0.025 (0.015) 0.009 (0.012)
∆ PP 0.019 (0.016) -0.025 (0.011) 0.012 (0.013) -0.029 (0.008) 0.022 (0.015) 0.008 (0.012)
∆ PP t-1 0.021 (0.016) -0.023 (0.012) 0.015 (0.013) -0.028 (0.010) 0.025 (0.016) 0.012 (0.013)
∆ PP t-2 0.027 (0.019) -0.027 (0.016) 0.019 (0.016) -0.033 (0.012) 0.030 (0.019) 0.015 (0.015)
∆ PP t-3 0.029 (0.021) -0.032 (0.018) 0.022 (0.019) -0.034 (0.016) 0.031 (0.021) 0.018 (0.018)
∆ PP t-4 0.028 (0.022) -0.035 (0.018) 0.024 (0.019) -0.035 (0.016) 0.030 (0.022) 0.018 (0.018)
∆ PP t-5 0.031 (0.023) -0.034 (0.019) 0.027 (0.021) -0.034 (0.017) 0.033 (0.023) 0.021 (0.020)
PP Lag t-6  0.029 (0.033) -0.048 (0.020) 0.024 (0.030) -0.047 (0.018) 0.031 (0.032) 0.017 (0.028)
∆ IC t+2 -0.007 (0.011) -0.003 (0.009) -0.003 (0.010) -0.002 (0.008) -0.005 (0.011) -0.003 (0.010)
∆ IC t+1 -0.017 (0.015) -0.010 (0.013) -0.012 (0.013) -0.009 (0.011) -0.014 (0.015) -0.009 (0.013)
∆ IC -0.023 (0.017) -0.014 (0.017) -0.017 (0.016) -0.012 (0.015) -0.021 (0.017) -0.015 (0.015)
∆ IC t-1 -0.025 (0.023) -0.015 (0.020) -0.014 (0.020) -0.008 (0.017) -0.023 (0.022) -0.014 (0.019)
∆ IC t-2 -0.019 (0.023) -0.009 (0.022) -0.008 (0.022) -0.003 (0.020) -0.017 (0.023) -0.009 (0.020)
∆ IC t-3 -0.014 (0.025) -0.002 (0.024) -0.002 (0.023) 0.006 (0.021) -0.013 (0.025) -0.004 (0.022)
∆ IC t-4 -0.016 (0.028) -0.001 (0.026) -0.004 (0.025) 0.007 (0.023) -0.013 (0.027) -0.006 (0.023)
∆ IC t-5 -0.016 (0.028) 0.000 (0.027) -0.005 (0.026) 0.007 (0.025) -0.012 (0.027) -0.007 (0.024)
IC Lag t-6 -0.016 (0.033) 0.001 (0.032) -0.006 (0.030) 0.008 (0.030) -0.013 (0.032) -0.011 (0.029)
Obs.
App. Table 2: Dynamic Effects of Employment-at-Will Doctrines on
 ASM Log Employment Levels, 1976-1999
Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors clustered on state reported in parentheses.
Plant FE,




Col. 1 plus Col. 1 plus Col. 5 plus
(2) (5)
Col. 1 plus











∆ GF t+2 0.011 (0.036) 0.046 (0.018) 0.002 (0.038) 0.037 (0.016)
∆ GF t+1 0.078 (0.054) 0.070 (0.018) 0.069 (0.056) 0.060 (0.018)
∆ GF 0.129 (0.052) 0.128 (0.024) 0.115 (0.055) 0.114 (0.024)
∆ GF t-1 0.108 (0.053) 0.132 (0.027) 0.087 (0.056) 0.113 (0.028)
∆ GF t-2 0.153 (0.062) 0.182 (0.031) 0.132 (0.065) 0.162 (0.033)
∆ GF t-3 0.169 (0.068) 0.197 (0.036) 0.133 (0.070) 0.162 (0.040)
∆ GF t-4 0.178 (0.072) 0.211 (0.036) 0.142 (0.077) 0.179 (0.038)
∆ GF t-5 0.205 (0.071) 0.248 (0.042) 0.162 (0.076) 0.209 (0.047)
GF Lag t-6  0.154 (0.104) 0.264 (0.052) 0.106 (0.107) 0.225 (0.053)
∆ PP t+2 0.079 (0.034) -0.012 (0.022) 0.088 (0.035) -0.010 (0.019)
∆ PP t+1 0.096 (0.028) -0.012 (0.019) 0.099 (0.028) -0.016 (0.015)
∆ PP 0.100 (0.028) -0.021 (0.021) 0.105 (0.030) -0.023 (0.017)
∆ PP t-1 0.098 (0.033) -0.031 (0.026) 0.102 (0.034) -0.037 (0.023)
∆ PP t-2 0.111 (0.045) -0.046 (0.034) 0.111 (0.044) -0.055 (0.029)
∆ PP t-3 0.125 (0.044) -0.041 (0.037) 0.125 (0.045) -0.049 (0.032)
∆ PP t-4 0.130 (0.046) -0.043 (0.039) 0.133 (0.048) -0.045 (0.033)
∆ PP t-5 0.125 (0.050) -0.057 (0.044) 0.128 (0.053) -0.061 (0.039)
PP Lag t-6  0.117 (0.071) -0.094 (0.049) 0.121 (0.079) -0.096 (0.043)
∆ IC t+2 -0.012 (0.023) -0.003 (0.014) -0.018 (0.026) -0.009 (0.013)
∆ IC t+1 -0.037 (0.032) -0.024 (0.019) -0.042 (0.034) -0.029 (0.017)
∆ IC -0.049 (0.037) -0.033 (0.025) -0.056 (0.041) -0.038 (0.022)
∆ IC t-1 -0.034 (0.053) -0.016 (0.035) -0.041 (0.060) -0.022 (0.030)
∆ IC t-2 -0.045 (0.056) -0.022 (0.041) -0.052 (0.062) -0.028 (0.036)
∆ IC t-3 -0.056 (0.060) -0.034 (0.044) -0.063 (0.066) -0.039 (0.040)
∆ IC t-4 -0.060 (0.065) -0.027 (0.048) -0.070 (0.070) -0.033 (0.042)
∆ IC t-5 -0.054 (0.068) -0.018 (0.049) -0.069 (0.073) -0.028 (0.043)





State Trends, State Trends
LBD Log Manufacturing Employment Levels, 1976-1999
Col. 1 plus
Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors clustered on state reported in parentheses.









∆ GF t+2 -0.036 (0.070) -0.008 (0.069) -0.033 (0.072) -0.005 (0.070) -0.025 (0.071) -0.019 (0.071)
∆ GF t+1 -0.012 (0.053) 0.045 (0.059) -0.013 (0.047) 0.039 (0.050) -0.007 (0.056) -0.008 (0.049)
∆ GF -0.046 (0.057) 0.018 (0.055) -0.051 (0.051) 0.008 (0.045) -0.051 (0.058) -0.053 (0.052)
∆ GF t-1 0.001 (0.054) 0.077 (0.066) -0.005 (0.048) 0.065 (0.056) 0.007 (0.055) 0.008 (0.049)
∆ GF t-2 0.159 (0.088) 0.250 (0.072) 0.139 (0.079) 0.223 (0.061) 0.165 (0.084) 0.148 (0.077)
∆ GF t-3 0.157 (0.082) 0.256 (0.081) 0.137 (0.073) 0.227 (0.070) 0.159 (0.082) 0.143 (0.075)
∆ GF t-4 0.118 (0.085) 0.221 (0.069) 0.081 (0.080) 0.175 (0.062) 0.128 (0.082) 0.088 (0.081)
∆ GF t-5 0.113 (0.058) 0.220 (0.063) 0.067 (0.054) 0.166 (0.051) 0.126 (0.053) 0.075 (0.052)
GF Lag t-6  0.082 (0.050) 0.237 (0.074) 0.047 (0.050) 0.187 (0.060) 0.086 (0.051) 0.049 (0.050)
∆ PP t+2 -0.006 (0.025) -0.021 (0.024) -0.018 (0.021) -0.036 (0.017) 0.001 (0.028) -0.017 (0.020)
∆ PP t+1 -0.004 (0.035) -0.027 (0.035) -0.013 (0.030) -0.041 (0.026) 0.002 (0.036) -0.015 (0.030)
∆ PP -0.036 (0.027) -0.067 (0.031) -0.035 (0.026) -0.071 (0.027) -0.026 (0.028) -0.035 (0.030)
∆ PP t-1 -0.015 (0.036) -0.052 (0.037) -0.014 (0.034) -0.054 (0.034) -0.010 (0.037) -0.017 (0.035)
∆ PP t-2 -0.019 (0.045) -0.055 (0.050) -0.016 (0.043) -0.059 (0.045) -0.012 (0.046) -0.018 (0.044)
∆ PP t-3 -0.021 (0.038) -0.063 (0.043) -0.011 (0.037) -0.061 (0.039) -0.015 (0.038) -0.013 (0.039)
∆ PP t-4 0.001 (0.039) -0.045 (0.044) 0.014 (0.039) -0.040 (0.041) 0.010 (0.039) 0.013 (0.040)
∆ PP t-5 -0.013 (0.036) -0.064 (0.044) -0.007 (0.038) -0.064 (0.043) -0.002 (0.035) -0.005 (0.040)
PP Lag t-6  0.008 (0.040) -0.067 (0.049) 0.016 (0.045) -0.064 (0.045) 0.016 (0.039) 0.016 (0.045)
∆ IC t+2 -0.005 (0.025) -0.002 (0.025) -0.005 (0.022) 0.002 (0.023) -0.004 (0.025) -0.002 (0.022)
∆ IC t+1 -0.017 (0.027) -0.013 (0.033) -0.017 (0.024) -0.008 (0.030) -0.013 (0.028) -0.011 (0.025)
∆ IC 0.003 (0.031) 0.008 (0.041) -0.002 (0.030) 0.010 (0.039) -0.002 (0.031) -0.004 (0.029)
∆ IC t-1 0.002 (0.033) 0.012 (0.047) 0.006 (0.032) 0.024 (0.044) 0.003 (0.034) 0.010 (0.032)
∆ IC t-2 0.009 (0.033) 0.024 (0.047) 0.009 (0.032) 0.031 (0.041) 0.006 (0.034) 0.008 (0.034)
∆ IC t-3 0.015 (0.035) 0.033 (0.052) 0.009 (0.036) 0.035 (0.048) 0.007 (0.035) 0.004 (0.038)
∆ IC t-4 -0.021 (0.032) 0.001 (0.053) -0.023 (0.034) 0.008 (0.050) -0.025 (0.033) -0.027 (0.037)
∆ IC t-5 0.011 (0.038) 0.035 (0.057) 0.008 (0.040) 0.041 (0.053) 0.008 (0.038) 0.006 (0.041)
IC Lag t-6 0.055 (0.033) 0.076 (0.057) 0.043 (0.036) 0.078 (0.055) 0.052 (0.033) 0.036 (0.040)
Obs.
App. Table 4: Dynamic Effects of Employment-at-Will Doctrines on














Col. 1 plus Col. 1 plus
Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors clustered on state reported in parentheses.
Plant FE,





∆ GF t+2 -0.037 (0.029) 0.001 (0.012) -0.039 (0.029) -0.003 (0.010) -0.047 (0.028) -0.029 (0.033)
∆ GF t+1 -0.052 (0.021) -0.009 (0.027) -0.059 (0.021) -0.019 (0.023) -0.060 (0.021) -0.047 (0.026)
∆ GF -0.079 (0.024) -0.044 (0.039) -0.090 (0.023) -0.056 (0.034) -0.090 (0.024) -0.079 (0.027)
∆ GF t-1 -0.055 (0.029) -0.032 (0.038) -0.070 (0.029) -0.045 (0.035) -0.069 (0.028) -0.061 (0.033)
∆ GF t-2 -0.051 (0.027) -0.053 (0.038) -0.067 (0.026) -0.063 (0.038) -0.063 (0.027) -0.046 (0.029)
∆ GF t-3 -0.027 (0.033) -0.039 (0.045) -0.039 (0.032) -0.045 (0.045) -0.042 (0.034) -0.022 (0.035)
∆ GF t-4 -0.007 (0.036) -0.033 (0.050) -0.021 (0.034) -0.039 (0.049) -0.020 (0.036) -0.002 (0.036)
∆ GF t-5 -0.029 (0.035) -0.066 (0.052) -0.046 (0.033) -0.073 (0.050) -0.043 (0.036) -0.024 (0.035)
GF Lag t-6  0.080 (0.032) -0.057 (0.050) 0.036 (0.023) -0.073 (0.045) 0.060 (0.034) 0.050 (0.022)
∆ PP t+2 -0.024 (0.017) 0.000 (0.010) -0.010 (0.011) 0.005 (0.008) -0.025 (0.017) -0.010 (0.010)
∆ PP t+1 -0.017 (0.017) 0.014 (0.011) 0.000 (0.012) 0.020 (0.010) -0.019 (0.017) 0.000 (0.011)
∆ PP -0.025 (0.020) 0.013 (0.015) -0.012 (0.015) 0.013 (0.013) -0.026 (0.019) -0.010 (0.014)
∆ PP t-1 -0.030 (0.023) 0.006 (0.019) -0.018 (0.018) 0.006 (0.016) -0.031 (0.023) -0.017 (0.017)
∆ PP t-2 -0.035 (0.026) 0.013 (0.020) -0.018 (0.019) 0.012 (0.017) -0.034 (0.027) -0.015 (0.018)
∆ PP t-3 -0.030 (0.027) 0.023 (0.021) -0.015 (0.020) 0.018 (0.018) -0.030 (0.027) -0.012 (0.018)
∆ PP t-4 -0.036 (0.028) 0.020 (0.023) -0.022 (0.020) 0.013 (0.019) -0.036 (0.028) -0.018 (0.018)
∆ PP t-5 -0.043 (0.027) 0.015 (0.023) -0.028 (0.020) 0.009 (0.020) -0.043 (0.027) -0.023 (0.018)
PP Lag t-6  -0.053 (0.034) 0.017 (0.025) -0.039 (0.025) 0.004 (0.021) -0.051 (0.034) -0.028 (0.023)
∆ IC t+2 0.012 (0.017) 0.014 (0.013) 0.001 (0.013) 0.006 (0.010) 0.014 (0.017) 0.006 (0.013)
∆ IC t+1 0.022 (0.020) 0.020 (0.016) 0.009 (0.015) 0.013 (0.014) 0.022 (0.020) 0.013 (0.015)
∆ IC 0.034 (0.024) 0.030 (0.022) 0.018 (0.018) 0.020 (0.019) 0.033 (0.024) 0.021 (0.018)
∆ IC t-1 0.042 (0.027) 0.035 (0.025) 0.022 (0.020) 0.021 (0.021) 0.040 (0.027) 0.024 (0.019)
∆ IC t-2 0.047 (0.030) 0.038 (0.026) 0.026 (0.022) 0.022 (0.022) 0.044 (0.029) 0.028 (0.021)
∆ IC t-3 0.040 (0.031) 0.029 (0.027) 0.018 (0.023) 0.013 (0.023) 0.037 (0.031) 0.019 (0.022)
∆ IC t-4 0.046 (0.032) 0.036 (0.027) 0.023 (0.022) 0.020 (0.023) 0.042 (0.031) 0.025 (0.022)
∆ IC t-5 0.041 (0.033) 0.029 (0.029) 0.019 (0.024) 0.014 (0.026) 0.037 (0.033) 0.021 (0.023)
IC Lag t-6 0.065 (0.037) 0.037 (0.033) 0.036 (0.026) 0.021 (0.028) 0.060 (0.037) 0.036 (0.026)
Obs.
App. Table 5: Dynamic Effects of Employment-at-Will Doctrines on
ASM Log Capital-Labor Ratio, 1976-1999
Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors clustered on state reported in parentheses.
Plant FE,




Col. 1 plus Col. 1 plus Col. 5 plus
(2) (5)
Col. 1 plus











∆ GF t+2 -0.006 (0.020) -0.010 (0.016) -0.005 (0.019) -0.010 (0.015) -0.008 (0.019) -0.008 (0.011)
∆ GF t+1 -0.007 (0.017) -0.010 (0.022) -0.003 (0.016) -0.008 (0.021) -0.010 (0.019) -0.008 (0.019)
∆ GF -0.006 (0.022) -0.011 (0.026) -0.008 (0.020) -0.014 (0.025) -0.007 (0.022) -0.009 (0.022)
∆ GF t-1 -0.026 (0.020) -0.032 (0.021) -0.023 (0.020) -0.031 (0.021) -0.027 (0.022) -0.027 (0.019)
∆ GF t-2 -0.016 (0.021) -0.022 (0.020) -0.012 (0.022) -0.019 (0.020) -0.019 (0.023) -0.015 (0.019)
∆ GF t-3 -0.032 (0.018) -0.040 (0.019) -0.031 (0.019) -0.039 (0.019) -0.039 (0.020) -0.037 (0.018)
∆ GF t-4 -0.036 (0.029) -0.046 (0.027) -0.035 (0.029) -0.046 (0.026) -0.042 (0.030) -0.039 (0.023)
∆ GF t-5 -0.011 (0.031) -0.022 (0.025) -0.013 (0.031) -0.025 (0.024) -0.020 (0.033) -0.019 (0.022)
GF Lag t-6  -0.016 (0.024) -0.041 (0.022) -0.014 (0.024) -0.040 (0.021) -0.014 (0.025) -0.012 (0.017)
∆ PP t+2 -0.002 (0.008) -0.003 (0.007) -0.002 (0.008) -0.003 (0.007) -0.001 (0.008) -0.001 (0.008)
∆ PP t+1 -0.004 (0.010) -0.006 (0.009) -0.004 (0.011) -0.006 (0.010) -0.007 (0.010) -0.009 (0.011)
∆ PP 0.007 (0.011) 0.004 (0.012) 0.009 (0.012) 0.006 (0.012) 0.003 (0.011) 0.003 (0.012)
∆ PP t-1 0.016 (0.011) 0.013 (0.012) 0.018 (0.012) 0.015 (0.012) 0.014 (0.012) 0.013 (0.014)
∆ PP t-2 0.007 (0.012) 0.007 (0.012) 0.007 (0.013) 0.007 (0.012) 0.000 (0.012) -0.003 (0.013)
∆ PP t-3 -0.001 (0.013) 0.001 (0.015) 0.000 (0.014) 0.001 (0.015) -0.005 (0.014) -0.006 (0.015)
∆ PP t-4 -0.004 (0.014) -0.002 (0.016) -0.006 (0.015) -0.003 (0.016) -0.006 (0.015) -0.008 (0.014)
∆ PP t-5 0.005 (0.013) 0.008 (0.016) 0.004 (0.014) 0.008 (0.017) 0.002 (0.014) 0.001 (0.014)
PP Lag t-6  0.001 (0.016) 0.011 (0.018) 0.000 (0.017) 0.010 (0.019) -0.004 (0.016) -0.004 (0.016)
∆ IC t+2 0.002 (0.009) -0.001 (0.008) 0.002 (0.009) -0.001 (0.009) 0.004 (0.010) 0.000 (0.010)
∆ IC t+1 0.002 (0.009) -0.003 (0.008) 0.003 (0.010) -0.002 (0.008) 0.001 (0.009) -0.004 (0.009)
∆ IC -0.003 (0.012) -0.007 (0.011) -0.002 (0.011) -0.006 (0.011) -0.003 (0.012) -0.009 (0.012)
∆ IC t-1 0.004 (0.011) -0.002 (0.011) 0.004 (0.011) -0.002 (0.011) 0.004 (0.011) -0.003 (0.011)
∆ IC t-2 -0.004 (0.012) -0.010 (0.012) -0.003 (0.013) -0.009 (0.013) -0.002 (0.012) -0.009 (0.012)
∆ IC t-3 -0.002 (0.012) -0.007 (0.014) -0.003 (0.013) -0.007 (0.015) 0.003 (0.013) -0.005 (0.012)
∆ IC t-4 0.001 (0.013) -0.003 (0.016) 0.000 (0.013) -0.004 (0.017) 0.003 (0.013) -0.005 (0.012)
∆ IC t-5 -0.009 (0.014) -0.013 (0.016) -0.008 (0.014) -0.012 (0.017) -0.005 (0.014) -0.012 (0.013)
IC Lag t-6 -0.002 (0.014) 0.000 (0.017) -0.002 (0.014) 0.001 (0.018) 0.001 (0.015) -0.005 (0.013)
Obs.
App. Table 6: Dynamic Effects of Employment-at-Will Doctrines on
ASM Total Factor Productivity, 1976-1999
Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors clustered on state reported in parentheses.  TFP is the establishment-level residual from a regression of value-
added on four factors of production (production employment, non-production employment, machinery and structures capital) at the industry-year level.
Plant FE,




Col. 1 plus Col. 1 plus Col. 5 plus
(2) (5)
Col. 1 plus











∆ GF t+2 -0.004 (0.029) -0.013 (0.015) 0.007 (0.022) -0.007 (0.012) -0.022 (0.030) -0.016 (0.018)
∆ GF t+1 -0.020 (0.028) -0.029 (0.015) -0.008 (0.022) -0.022 (0.012) -0.037 (0.029) -0.031 (0.020)
∆ GF -0.017 (0.040) -0.033 (0.028) -0.001 (0.029) -0.020 (0.020) -0.037 (0.041) -0.027 (0.029)
∆ GF t-1 -0.010 (0.037) -0.031 (0.024) 0.007 (0.027) -0.017 (0.018) -0.030 (0.038) -0.021 (0.026)
∆ GF t-2 0.024 (0.027) -0.012 (0.019) 0.033 (0.023) -0.002 (0.017) 0.004 (0.028) 0.009 (0.017)
∆ GF t-3 0.022 (0.028) -0.024 (0.022) 0.032 (0.023) -0.010 (0.018) 0.000 (0.030) 0.004 (0.021)
∆ GF t-4 0.018 (0.029) -0.038 (0.023) 0.030 (0.024) -0.019 (0.020) -0.003 (0.031) 0.003 (0.021)
∆ GF t-5 0.022 (0.027) -0.042 (0.023) 0.032 (0.022) -0.023 (0.020) 0.002 (0.027) 0.007 (0.020)
GF Lag t-6  0.068 (0.034) -0.056 (0.029) 0.074 (0.029) -0.026 (0.022) 0.044 (0.034) 0.046 (0.021)
∆ PP t+2 0.018 (0.009) 0.012 (0.005) 0.014 (0.007) 0.015 (0.004) 0.017 (0.010) 0.010 (0.007)
∆ PP t+1 0.017 (0.011) 0.011 (0.008) 0.013 (0.009) 0.015 (0.007) 0.016 (0.012) 0.008 (0.009)
∆ PP 0.017 (0.012) 0.010 (0.009) 0.010 (0.010) 0.013 (0.009) 0.017 (0.013) 0.006 (0.010)
∆ PP t-1 0.025 (0.013) 0.015 (0.010) 0.017 (0.010) 0.020 (0.010) 0.024 (0.014) 0.011 (0.011)
∆ PP t-2 0.016 (0.014) 0.012 (0.010) 0.010 (0.012) 0.020 (0.010) 0.016 (0.014) 0.006 (0.012)
∆ PP t-3 0.019 (0.013) 0.015 (0.009) 0.014 (0.012) 0.023 (0.009) 0.020 (0.014) 0.010 (0.012)
∆ PP t-4 0.017 (0.014) 0.013 (0.009) 0.010 (0.012) 0.021 (0.009) 0.017 (0.015) 0.006 (0.013)
∆ PP t-5 0.010 (0.014) 0.009 (0.010) 0.004 (0.013) 0.017 (0.009) 0.011 (0.016) 0.000 (0.013)
PP Lag t-6  -0.007 (0.019) 0.006 (0.010) -0.011 (0.016) 0.015 (0.010) -0.007 (0.021) -0.012 (0.016)
∆ IC t+2 -0.006 (0.009) -0.003 (0.005) -0.007 (0.007) -0.002 (0.005) -0.005 (0.009) -0.006 (0.007)
∆ IC t+1 -0.005 (0.011) -0.001 (0.007) -0.007 (0.009) 0.000 (0.007) -0.006 (0.012) -0.007 (0.009)
∆ IC -0.007 (0.013) -0.003 (0.007) -0.007 (0.011) 0.001 (0.009) -0.009 (0.014) -0.007 (0.011)
∆ IC t-1 -0.002 (0.013) -0.001 (0.008) -0.003 (0.012) 0.002 (0.010) -0.005 (0.014) -0.005 (0.012)
∆ IC t-2 0.003 (0.014) 0.004 (0.010) 0.001 (0.012) 0.005 (0.011) 0.000 (0.015) -0.002 (0.012)
∆ IC t-3 0.004 (0.015) 0.004 (0.012) 0.003 (0.014) 0.006 (0.013) 0.001 (0.016) -0.001 (0.013)
∆ IC t-4 0.000 (0.016) 0.001 (0.011) 0.000 (0.014) 0.004 (0.012) -0.005 (0.016) -0.007 (0.013)
∆ IC t-5 0.001 (0.017) 0.002 (0.013) 0.000 (0.015) 0.004 (0.014) -0.003 (0.017) -0.007 (0.014)
IC Lag t-6 0.002 (0.019) 0.008 (0.013) 0.003 (0.018) 0.010 (0.016) 0.000 (0.021) -0.003 (0.017)
Obs.
ASM Log Labor Productivity, 1976-1999














Col. 1 plus Col. 1 plus
Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors clustered on state reported in parentheses.
Plant FE,
YR FE SIC2-YR FE
State FE,
State Trends
SIC2-YR FE